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Fire service personnel are ideally suited to contribute to the concerted national 
effort of homeland security.  If they intend to be an effective component of this effort 
then a revamping of existing preparedness activities must occur.  This thesis will analyze 
the effectiveness of the Los Angeles Fire Departments counterterrorism efforts to date. 
The central argument is that much more needs to be accomplished in the area of 
prevention strategies.   
The way ahead will require an analysis of the impediments to change which 
continue to obstruct the department’s progress toward preventative measures. Barriers 
discussed herein are leadership, firefighting culture, lack of training and educational 
opportunities, and ineffective use of community involvement.  
The citizens of the United States have benefited from awareness and prevention 
programs in the past. Three models were considered to determine which attributes could 
be extracted and used to construct the foundation for a terrorism prevention model. 
Frameworks used in some nationally recognized agendas were studied in order to draw 
information for the development of a terrorism awareness program for first responders.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 16, 2002, President George W. Bush approved the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security.  In this strategy, homeland security is defined as “a concerted 
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur.”1  Firefighters, paramedics, and emergency medical technicians are ideally suited 
to contribute to this concerted national effort. The fire service profession has traditionally 
been organized and trained to perform as a “reactionary” service, however, and one that 
usually responds to an incident only after it has reached emergency status.  If the fire 
service intends to be an effective component of the national effort to secure our 
communities from terrorism, then a complete revamping of existing policies, training and 
field duties must occur.  Traditional mindsets and field operations must give way to more 
“proactive” efforts calculated to prevent or interrupt terrorist activities rather than simply 
to respond after an attack has been initiated. 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, local fire, police and emergency medical 
agencies throughout the nation have been challenged to redefine their missions 
concerning the newly-recognized vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.  Even proven 
disaster preparedness models have required modifications to include this new reality.  In 
most established institutions, change is difficult and requires the commitment and 
dedication of organizational leadership as well as the appropriate training of line 
personnel.  The challenges now faced by the fire service will necessarily involve 
deliberate and innovative change, some of which is operational and some cultural. 
Fortunately, the fire service can benefit from existing models of successful 
institutional change associated with extra-departmental pressures.  One such model is the 
Community Oriented Policing effort that successfully developed a community relations 
approach to policing and implemented it universally in order to bridge the gap between 
police and citizens.  Another major example of successful change is the “Drug Abuse 
                                                 
1 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002),  2.  
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Resistance Education” (DARE) program in which law enforcement efforts were 
redirected from arresting offenders towards a proactive intervention of younger school 
children before they engaged in drug-related criminal activity. 
For more than a century, professional fire service personnel have been trained, 
equipped, and practiced in responding to emergencies in progress, be they natural or 
man-made.  Over the last 35 years the fire service has learned to participate in the public 
dialogue, legislative processes and code enforcement as effective means of fire 
prevention.  Such a shift from a reactive to proactive approach is significant.  The 1973 
“America Burning” report emphasized the need for fire safety inspections, public 
education programs, building code enforcement and other forms of community exchange 
that proved useful in decreasing life and property loss caused by fire.  This is important 
because it offers an obvious framework in which a terrorism awareness and prevention 
program can be designed and implemented.  Street-level firefighters and emergency 
medical personnel could easily be trained to recognize certain terrorist-related conditions 
and rapidly communicate their observations to the appropriate enforcement agency for a 
more timely intervention, thus preventing or interrupting a potential terrorist attack before 
it is initiated.  This concept is similar to that of fire prevention in that pre-incident 
inspections are used to identify fire hazards and correct them before they occur. 
To date, the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) has committed considerable 
resources to achieving the mandates of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  
They are relatively recent and untested efforts; but the fact that strategies have been 
drafted to mobilize and organize the efforts of the LAFD is an important first step.  The 
creation of the Special Operations Division has organized all counter- and anti-terror 
planning efforts under one umbrella so that better oversight can be achieved.  The 
greatest successes for the department thus far are the improvements in collaboration with 
their regional partners such as LAPD, LA County Sheriff and Fire Departments, LA 
County Health, FBI, ICE and many others.  The acquisition of response equipment and 
training has improved the safety of both the first responders and the citizens they serve.  
There must be a continuing effort toward educating both groups in prevention rather than  
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response.  In order for the LAFD to comply with the National Strategy it needs more 
effective leadership, community interaction, clearly stated missions, organization, and 
sustained funding and commitment.  
This thesis will describe the LAFD’s most recent terrorism-related initiatives in 
order to document them for the first time and to assess their effectiveness; it will identify 
the institutional impairments and cultural barriers that impede change; examine the most 
robust and successful models for both prevention-oriented and terrorism-specific policies 
and programs in order to derive lessons learned; look at the predominant national 
terrorism and prevention frameworks into which any new terrorism training program 
would need to be set; and develop the initial recommendations for policies and programs 
to achieve terrorism prevention competence and awareness both within the LAFD and in 
the communities it serves.  
In addition to identifying the components of a successful terrorism awareness 
training program through analysis of existing models and programs, a prototype 
curriculum for such training is provided in Appendix A. As will become clear in 
following chapters, the training of line personnel in terrorism awareness, identification, 
and response is only one aspect of a comprehensive anti-terrorism mission within the 
LAFD or any other fire service; others include endorsement and participation at the 
leadership level; funding and significant asset allocation; and a community awareness 
and outreach campaign. Although the body of this work will include discussion of all of 
these components, the Appendix will address only the first of these, the training 
curriculum.  
First responders, specifically firefighters, are very well-positioned to collect 
intelligence and report suspicious activity.  Firefighters and paramedics are called to 
potential safe houses and terrorist workshops; education and training will arm them to 
detect and disrupt the enemy that lives and operates in the community.  They first need to 
receive effective training that includes the following elements: 
• The Definition of Terrorism 
• Terrorist Threats 
• Terrorist Strategies  
4 
• Terrorist Tactics 
• Terrorist Targets 
• Situational Awareness 
 
An effective terrorism awareness training program will also discuss indicators of 
terrorist planning and connect them to reporting mechanisms for the investigative phase. 
It is crucial that first responders be taught the notification procedures for accessing law 
enforcement agency response.  The LAFD currently has a reporting system in place via 
the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program (TLO).  All line personnel must be provided 
training on this program so that suspicious behavior or unusual events noticed on the 
streets can be investigated by the proper law enforcement authorities who work closely 
with the TLO officers in the Terrorism Early Warning Group. 
The ideas and arguments presented in this thesis are driven by several source 
documents: national strategies that constitute the bulk of the literature germane to this 
project. These documents provide the mandate for first responders to participate in the 
Homeland Security mission, and provide preliminary guidance on the parameters and 
priorities of such participation. Insofar as the LAFD has exhibited a general resistance or 
reluctance to change – especially with regard to its mission – this research has relied on a 
small but important literature on the culture of firefighting. Information on the prevention 
and terrorism models and frameworks discussed in Chapter III are comprised mostly of 
editions written by terrorism experts within two McGraw-Hill homeland security 
textbooks.  Contributions come also from a study on COP by the RAND Corporation and 
from the CERT Participant Handbook. Finally, there is an extensive literature on 
terrorism itself and the various aspects of its prevention: terrorism recognition techniques, 
indicators of terrorist activity, and first responder awareness procedures among others; 
these bear on the composition of the curriculum proposed in Appendix A. 
The President of the United States, through the then-Office of Homeland Security, 
clearly stated the direction of the war on terror in the 2002 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security: 
5 
The first priority of homeland security is to prevent terrorist attacks.  The 
United States aims to deter all potential terrorists from attacking America 
through our uncompromising commitment to defeating terrorism wherever 
it appears.  We also strive to detect terrorists before they strike, to prevent 
them and their instruments of terror from entering our country, and to take 
decisive action to eliminate the threat they pose.2 
The National Strategy goes even further in recognizing the public at large as well as state 
and local governments as playing a vital role in securing the nation. This was 
supplemented in June 2003 by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of 
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Guidelines for Homeland Security:  Prevention and 
Deterrence.  In this document, ODP identifies several specific guidelines that reflect a 
foundation of actions or activities representing a “framework for prevention” that each 
jurisdiction should consider applying to anti-terrorism activities. These guidelines are 
flexible and provide for increased and unique functionality of jurisdictions and account 
for specific threats, vulnerabilities, risks, and available resources. The guidelines 
represent a set of general activities, objectives, and elements that organizations – and 
specifically those in command positions within the organizations – should consider in the 
development of prevention plans.3 
The guidelines are divided into five functional categories: Collaboration, 
Information Sharing, Threat Recognition, Risk Management, and Intervention. The 
LAFD has made significant progress in its collaborative relationships and information-
sharing capabilities with members of allied agencies.  The LAFD has fallen short, 
however, in the critical category of threat recognition.  ODP clearly identifies a need for 
first responders (fire, police, EMS, etc.) to conduct line-level training so that public 
safety personnel may recognize possible terrorist related behaviors or conditions, and do 
so in a lawful and effective manner.  ODP suggests teaching first responders to recognize 
“an inventory of behaviors and/or activities that constitute suspicious behavior likely to 
                                                 
2 National Strategy, 2. 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland 
Security, Prevention and Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 2003), 4. As of January 2006, ODP is 
now known as the Office of Grants and Training (G&T). 
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forewarn of a pending terrorism conspiracy or plot.”4  This project will adopt the 
guidance of these two essential federal documents to conclude the project with an 
awareness curriculum geared toward proactive measures.  
If the LAFD is to achieve the goals and objectives set out in the National 
Strategy, a fundamental understanding of its traditional culture, folklore and practices is 
prerequisite.  Many government agencies, especially those such as the fire service with 
deeply-rooted traditions and mindsets, seldom initiate and in fact often resist change.  
Such resistance constitutes a significant barrier to both progress and innovation, 
particularly in the organizational setting.  Researchers at NASA define organizational 
culture as “the values, beliefs, rituals, symbols and behaviors we share with others that 
help define us as a group.  Further, a culture’s surface structure consists of the values and 
beliefs that, in turn, guide a person’s actions; these cultural characteristics are then 
transmitted to succeeding generations.”5  This holds true in the fire service as behaviors, 
rituals, and symbols are perpetuated from one generation to the next. 
In his article entitled “Cultural Changes for Firefighter Safety,” Ed Shepard 
describes the firefighting culture as being “grounded in heroism and likened to war, 
where risk-taking is glorified and rewarded, then amplified through the pens of 
journalists, and passed on to the rookies, decade after decade.”6  In short, prevention 
activities are not as exciting and thrilling as structural firefighting operations.  Shepard 
also suggests that change is predicated on the leadership of the organization and that 
culture is changed by a series of small steps taken by leading members of the culture at 
various organizational levels.  Accepting these observations as valid, it is clear that 
critical change within the LAFD to address anti-terrorism will take time; more of an 
evolution than a revolution.  Organizational change will require leadership at all levels, 
open and effective communications, and a transition from the previous reactionary model  
                                                 
4 Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines, 20. 
5 Ed Shepard, “Cultural Changes for Firefighter Safety,” Wildfire Magazine (April 1999). Available 
from http://www.esb.act.gov.au/firebreak/shepard.html (Accessed 11 November 2004). 
6 Ibid., par. 7.   
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to one that is proactive.  Such a significant shift must be shared consistently by all levels 
of the Department and must be consistently reflected in all of the LAFD policies, training 
and field practices.  
Marilyn Arlund completed an applied research project for the National Fire 
Academy in 1999 as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program.  This work draws some 
compelling conclusions as to inhibitors to prevention, among them lack of training, time, 
funding, leadership, and other organizational shortfalls.7  Firefighters’ Attitudes Toward 
Fire Prevention Activities is a strategic analysis of community risk reduction in the 
Maple Grove Fire Prevention Bureau.  Arlund’s survey determines that attitudes are 
learned as a result of past experience by observing other people’s attitudes and by being 
openly taught to hold certain attitudes.   
Collectively, these documents and studies illuminate obvious areas of concern for 
the LAFD, particularly germane to its new role in the war on terrorism. Terry Golway’s 
article “Firefighters” in American Heritage Magazine and the Managing Fire Services 
textbook are useful documents for studying the origins of the fire service culture.  
An early fire prevention model is the 1947 Guide to Community Organization for 
Fire Safety as promulgated by the President’s Conference on Fire Prevention.  The 
objectives of this early guide were threefold: 1) to emphasize the ever-present danger by 
fire to human life and natural resources, 2) to improve fire safety in every community, 
and 3) to influence responsible public officials to accept their primary responsibility for 
leadership in fire safety.  There were two basic recommendations: a call for governors of 
each state to appoint statewide fire safety committees to explore the fire loss problem for 
the purpose of setting up a practical fire prevention program, and a call upon mayors, city 
managers, or chief executives of all towns to appoint fire safety committees to carry on a 
continuous fire safety campaign.   
This early document goes on to suggest committee make-up and organization, 
identifies what to do in terms of soliciting community involvement, and lists special 
                                                 
7 Marylyn Arlund, Firefighter’s Attitudes Toward Fire Prevention Activities: Strategic Analysis of 
Community Risk Reduction  (Emmitsburg, Maryland: National Fire Academy, 1999), 83. 
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activities to intensify public interest and participation in the campaign.8  This document is 
of particular interest to this thesis because it is instrumental in identifying key 
components of prevention activities including identifying the threat posed from fire, 
challenges public officials and leaders to accept the responsibility to address the issue, 
and involves politicians from all levels to participate in the solution to America’s fire 
problem.  This foundational work is very pertinent to addressing America’s new 
challenges posed by terrorism. 
Despite the early efforts of the president’s 1947 Conference on Fire Prevention, 
however, the nation continued to suffer from a severe fire problem throughout the next 
three decades.  In 1971, President Richard Nixon approved the National Commission on 
Fire Prevention and Control to study the fire problem and make recommendations 
“whereby the Nation can reduce the destruction of life and property caused by fire in the 
cities, suburbs, communities, and elsewhere.”9  The study is of particular significance to 
this project because it was the first report to specifically identify solutions to the Nation’s 
fire problem.  It identified the following objectives: to marshal scientific and monetary 
resources, to increase public education opportunities, to set standards for fire safety, to 
explore technological advances, and to improve inspection procedures.  Recruiting a 
diverse workforce, improving firefighting equipment, increasing training opportunities, 
standardizing policies and procedures, setting goals to address problems, and allocating 
funds to devise programs were also recommendations generated by this report.10  
More recently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conducted a 
formal study called “America At Risk: America Burning Recommissioned” in which the 
role of local fire service was reoriented to more effectively control fire risks and establish 
fire prevention protocols.11  Here again we have a highly successful and proactive model 
                                                 
8 The President's Conference on Fire Prevention: A Guide to Community Organization for Fire Safety 
(Washington, D.C., 1947), 2-8. 
9 National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control, “America Burning; Report” (Washington, 
D.C.; U.S.Government Printing Office, 1973), 1-9.  
10 Ibid, 2-9. 
11  United States Fire Administration and Federal Emergency Management Agency, America at Risk:  
America Burning Recommissioned  (Emmitsburg, Maryland: National Fire Academy, 2002), 6. 
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that offers tremendous insight and empirical information concerning institutional change, 
as well as the lessons learned of  prevention-related policies.  
In this earlier effort, a series of topics were discussed in five different hearings in 
cities scattered across the nation.  The main topics included standardization, inspection 
procedures, technological advances, and governmental involvement.  In 1973, the 
Commission issued its landmark report “America Burning” which details the 
unacceptably high life and property losses from fire.  The report highlights the need for 
federal government involvement and cites nearly 100 recommendations for change in the 
fire service.  The report enjoyed nationwide acceptance and later became the catalyst for 
Public Law 93-498, the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974.12 The United 
States Fire Administration (USFA) was created shortly after the passage of the Act of 
1974 and has been integrated into fire management and risk reduction programs ever 
since.  These two reports, and legislation that stemmed from them, are important to the 
LAFD because they offer a framework that will assist the fire service in finding solutions 
to the current threat of terrorism. 
In late 1999, FEMA reconstituted the National Commission on Fire Prevention 
and Control in an effort to further reduce loss from injury and fire.  The director of 
FEMA, James Lee Witt, wrote, “the commission will fulfill an essential role in the 
initiation of a much needed, and long-awaited, national effort to continue tangible 
reductions in our country’s losses to fire.  Equally importantly, it will also provide a 
critical framework for the evolving role of the fire services in the safety and sustainability 
of today’s American Communities…Your panel will recommend an approach to an 
updated and renewed vision of the fire service community.”13  During the first meeting of 
the Commission, the panel determined it would be vital to go beyond the boundaries of 
fire risk alone and explore additional hazards, including terrorist attack. 
A very significant recommendation emanating from the report relative to 
prevention and antiterrorism is Finding Number 7: Public Education and Awareness, 
                                                 
12 “America Burning,” 7.  
13 America at Risk, 6. 
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which states that FEMA/USFA should develop and support a multi-hazard public 
awareness strategy that advances safety and messages for all risks to which fire 
departments respond.14  As in the original “America Burning” findings, emergency 
medical service response was identified as deficient, as fire departments moved toward a 
dual-response service.  This commission was faced with the all-hazard challenges, both 
man-made and natural. 
There is a plethora of courses and texts available on terrorism from which to build 
a curriculum on terrorism awareness.  Most anti-terrorism sources that might be relevant 
to first responders are oriented to WMD response rather than pre-incident preparedness. 
The Emergency Response to Terrorism course sponsored by U.S Department of Justice, 
FEMA, and USFA, for example, does not make reference to recognition strategies or 
indicators of suspicious activity.15  This is unfortunate given the fact that prevention of 
terrorist attacks is the primary goal of the National Strategy. 
In ODP’s Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence, 
awareness and recognition training are recommended for police, fire, and EMS personnel.  
Malcolm Nance, author of The Terrorist Recognition Handbook, argues that “terrorist 
operations are observable, their preparations can be detected, and attacks can be stopped 
before they begin.”16  The Handbook addresses the full range of terrorists planning 
behaviors, including tactics, strategies, preparations, surveillance techniques, tools, 
training, and ideologies.  Firefighters will be better prepared to detect terrorist planning 
activities if educated on those behaviors common to terrorists in the pre-attack phase. 
Paul Maniscalco and Hank Christen further point out that “scene awareness 
principles begin before the response in any incident (routine or terrorism),” in their book 
Understanding Terrorism and Managing the Consequences, and they suggest that first 
responders should be familiar with the neighborhood, the surroundings, the violence 
                                                 
14 America at Risk, 24. 
15 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
United States Fire Administration, Emergency Response to Terrorism Self Study (Emmitsburg, Maryland: 
National Fire Academy, 1999), table. 
16 Malcolm W. Nance, The Terrorism Recognition Guidebook (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons 
Press, 2003), preface. 
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history in the area, gang involvement, scheduled special events, recent political action, 
and scheduled religious ceremonies in any community.17 This accords with the precepts 
of Community-Oriented Policing that will prove so fundamental to this paper’s 
recommendations. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS jointly developed the 
Terrorist Threats to the U.S. Homeland Reporting Guide (TTRG) with the purpose of 
leveraging the vast information-collection and -reporting resources of our state, local, and 
tribal first responder partners to recognize activities or conditions that may be indicative 
of terrorist activity.  This guide suggests that local organizations are on the front lines in 
the war on terror and therefore have a critical role as primary sources of information:  
“Timely and relevant information from the front lines is critical to the identification of 
terrorists and their supporters, development of insights into their plans and intentions, and 
subsequent disruption of their operations.”18  This material is critical to the development 
of antiterrorism education for first responders as they engage in the concerted national 
effort to protect the homeland against terrorism. 
Finally, the National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training and 
ODP offer their Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program, which 
discusses physical characteristics of the tools of terrorism, behavioral patterns exhibited 
by terrorists, and media used by terrorists.  First responders will be much better prepared 
to report suspicious behaviors once educated about the particular characteristics, tactics, 




                                                 
17 Hank Christen and Paul Maniscalco, Understanding Terrorism and Managing the Consequences 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 45. 
18 Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, Terrorist Threats to the 
U.S. Homeland: Reporting Guide (n.p., n.d.), Available from http://www.leo.gov.  
19 Office of Homeland Security, Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program: Resources 
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II. CURRENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE LAFD  
In 2005, the LAFD created an entire division to oversee its homeland security 
programs.  The Special Operations Division was launched at the beginning of the year 
and has received recent approval from the Mayor’s office for an additional 20 officer 
positions.  The LAFD has made great strides to combat terrorism in a relatively short 
period of time.  These programs, along with several others, indicate that LAFD has in fact 
accepted its new role in terrorism deterrence; but despite all that has been done, its efforts 
have fallen short in meeting the President’s primary goal of prevention.  Line personnel 
have essentially been excluded from many of the contemporary programs created to deal 
with terrorism.   
Many causes of America’s fire problem were listed in the America Burning report 
and are very similar to today’s failures in preventing terrorism: 
There are fire department administrators who pay lip service to fire 
prevention and then do little to promote it.  The public shares their 
unconcern, for in the public’s image – an image which firefighters share – 
the fire department is a heroic-proportioned battalion of people rescuers 
and fire suppressors, not a professional corps of fire preventers.20 
An example of such “lip service” was demonstrated in 2005 when the administration 
made the decision to reduce staffing levels of the Fire Safety and Education Unit: the unit 
responsible for administering the Community Emergency Response Team program to the 
residents of Los Angeles. 
Additionally, LAFD administrators have failed to communicate their 
counterterrorism strategy to line-level personnel in their haste to create a structure to 
combat terrorism.  Furthermore, no vision of this new mission has been shared with the 
rank and file.  What has been clear, however, is the department’s commitment to prepare 
to respond as noted in the increase in field and tabletop exercises. 
To compound this, resources necessary for the prevention of terrorism are costly; 
since there has not yet been a successful significant attack in Los Angeles, funding for 
                                                 
20 “America Burning,” 2. 
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prevention has not been a priority.  The purchase of new equipment and technology 
seems to be a much more tangible investment to department administrators. 
 
A. LAFD SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION 
Los Angeles is the largest metropolitan area on the west coast and is thus a high-
visibility and high-priority target for terrorist acts. The city has already been the target of 
at least one significant terrorist threat that was fortunately detected and interrupted at the 
Canadian border.21  It is likely that the city will be targeted again, so it is imperative not 
only to be prepared to respond to attack, but also to take steps to circumvent any planned 
attacks. As with most public safety and emergency response agencies, the LAFD must 
recognize, accept and prepare for the critical tasks associated with being placed on the 
“front lines” of terrorism.  
The LAFD has a unique and impressive experience base with regard to certain 
man-made and natural disasters; this practical knowledge must now be expanded to 
include acts of terrorism in terms of detection, prevention and large-scale emergency 
responses.  It is essential that the continuing efforts of the LAFD closely match the 
national and global objectives in combating terrorist activities.  Clearly, the LAFD and its 
counterparts in L.A. or elsewhere have much yet to accomplish, particularly in terms of 
prevention and preparedness planning. In this chapter, the current state of preparedness 
and the future needs of the LAFD will be identified and measured against the national 
framework of strategies and initiatives.   
To date, the LAFD is responding to some extent to the challenges posed in the 
post- 9/11 threat environment.  The primary accomplishment in this area by the LAFD 
has been the creation of the Special Operation Division (SOD); this new task force 
consists of three sections, as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                 
21  Mark A. Sauter and James J. Carafano, Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, 






Table 1. LAFD Special Operations Division Organization Chart (Draft) (From:  LAFD 
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Battalion Chief (1)
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Senior Clerk Typist (1)
Administrative Support
Management Analyst II (1)
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Captain II (1)
Captain I (2)
















As the SOD is so new, very few people are aware of its existence, structure, or 
mission. The SOD is headed by an LAFD Division Commander.  This position comports 
with incident command structure guidelines and supports common span of control 
requirements.  Under this new command, the LAFD has designated three sections:  
Homeland Security Intelligence Section, Homeland Security Planning Section, and the 
Tactical Training Section, each with its own missions and responsibilities. 
The Homeland Security Intelligence Section is headed by an LAFD Battalion 
Chief with internal clerical support.  This section conducts inter-agency liaison work 
concerning threat information and assessments.  It typically processes confidential 
information concerning national security issues, and thus personnel assigned to this 
section must qualify for high-level security clearances. 
The mission of the Homeland Security Intelligence Section has several 
components. It oversees the functions of the LAFD Terrorism Liaison Officer Unit, and 
represents the LAFD in the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group – a 
networked, multi-agency mechanism for analyzing and disseminating intelligence and 
terrorism-related information. The Intelligence Section not only works with the TEW, but 
also functions independently as a fully-integrated intelligence center capable of 
gathering, evaluating, and disseminating terrorist-related data in support of LAFD 
operations, including fire suppression, emergency medical responses and other threats to 
public safety. This branch of the SOD identifies and responds to potential terrorist-related 
activity with emphasis on detection, prevention and mitigation. Lastly, it serves as a 
central LAFD repository for terrorism-related information with emphasis on internal and 
allied agency communications, including the timely notification to LAFD units of 
information or conditions that may affect field operations. 
The Homeland Security Planning Section, like the Intelligence Section, is headed 
by an LAFD Battalion Chief with internal clerical support.  There are five specialized 
units under this command, including Special Events, Mass Disaster, 
Evacuation/Relocation and Weapons of Mass Destruction units, and Project Archangel. 
The mission of the Homeland Security Planning Section is wide, and includes 
establishing the procedures for, coordinating and responding to mass casualty, WMD, 
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and natural disaster incidents.  This Unit is concerned with the evacuation and relocation 
of citizens in the event of a large-scale man-made or natural disaster, and also provides 
advanced emergency response planning for large-scale events, high-profile or -target 
venues, VIP/dignitary protection, and coordination with tactical law enforcement 
operations. 
The Planning Section strives to achieve both site-specific incident management 
and broader regional issues to integrate homeland security, emergency management, law 
enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health and safety, EMS, and the private 
sector into a unified structure. This is directly related to providing advanced planning for 
the coordination of local, regional, and large-scale evacuations including temporary and 
long term relocation of evacuees. It is presently working in partnership with the LAPD 
and the Department of Homeland Security to develop a Critical Asset Protection Program 
for the nation’s infrastructure. 
The third branch of the SOD is the Tactical Training Section, again directed by an 
LAFD Battalion Chief with internal clerical and administrative support; it has four 
specialized units under this command, including Simulation, Exercise, Regional Training, 
and Special Training Projects units. 
The mission areas of the Tactical Training Section begin with planning, designing 
and implementing both table-top and field training exercises based on terrorism-related 
scenarios, including contemporary threat assessments and high-risk targets. This section 
provides scenario-based “command and control” training exercises, including practical 
applications of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Unified Incident Command 
System, and coordinates regional training opportunities for local first responders, 
including instructor skills, fire prevention, incident management and terrorism awareness. 
This section is ideally suited to incorporate a recognition and awareness program for line-
level personnel.  Monthly training and networking opportunities for the Los Angeles 
Terrorism Liaison Officers are provided by this section, as well as educational seminars 
addressing terrorist threats, prevention, deterrence and preparedness, including incident 
mitigation, response and recovery.    
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B. SMART PRACTICES: TEW, TLO, AND ARCHANGEL 
The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group is nationally recognized 
as a multi-discipline, multi-agency mechanism that draws together a local network of 
public and private agencies serving multiple fusion functions and provides information 
on indicators and warnings, operational assessments, and threat assessments of special 
events with attack potential.  LAFD has been an active participant in the group 
since1998.22  
Inability to “connect the dots” has been at the root of intelligence failures in the 
past.  The LA TEW is a multilateral, multi-disciplinary effort where agencies are co-
located to monitor open-source data to identify trends and potential threats, and where net 
assessments are produced to improve decision making processes during actual terrorist 
events.  Members of the TEW also monitor specific threat information during periods of 
heightened concern so the information can be transferred to line personnel charged with 
protecting the citizens of Los Angeles County.  Additionally, the members work together 
to complete vulnerability and target assessments so that comprehensive Risk Information 
Folders can be developed for use by incident commanders during field operations.  
The TEW is widely known because it is the first program of its kind to implement 
and sustain a collaborative information sharing program both pre- and post-9/11.  This 
program is particularly unique and effective because it has incorporated several 
components into its fusion efforts, including a planning framework, response phases and 
intelligence cycles, networked response (there is no entity in charge), indications and 
warnings monitoring, and monthly plenary sessions.  It  created a “playbook committee” 
for the development of response guides for WMD and critical infrastructure attacks, 
emerging threat committee to explore evolving threats from emerging weapons, and the 
net assessment group which develops situational awareness for the unified command staff 
working at actual incidents.  The TEW has proven that great strides can be made when 
diverse groups work together to solve complex problems.The Los Angeles Urban Area 
                                                 
22 John P. Sullivan, “The Local Need for Intelligence and Warning,” in Bioterrorism: Homeland 
Security, The Next Steps, Conference Proceedings, February 8-10, 2004, 1-7.  Available from 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/bioterror/index.html. Accessed on 1/10/2006. 
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Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program was created and implemented by the LAFD in 
March 2005.  This program is designed as an information sharing mechanism for internal 
and external partners in the Los Angeles regional area. Dedicated staff positions have 
been committed to this effort.   The two LAFD captains assigned to this position are 
located in the TEW and work collaboratively with the various response agencies 
involved.  The TLO’s primary function is to be the link for information traveling both 
from the TEW and the street.  For example, if a firefighter observes a suspicious person 
conducting surveillance operations near the runway at LAX, he or she can report it to the 
TLO who can then report it to the JTTF for further investigation.  Conversely, if the TLO 
members assigned at the TEW notice trends and potential threats in their daily open 
source analysis, the TLO can report that information to field personnel so they can adjust 
operational procedures as needed.  
Operation Archangel is a program sponsored by the Department of Homeland 
Security aimed at critical infrastructure protection, threat assessment, and special event 
operational planning within the City of Los Angeles.  The LAFD has had dedicated staff 
working with the LAPD and other homeland security partners for nearly two years. This 
program was developed with multiple state and federal agency involvement, and 
designed in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness.  Archangel is another multi-agency/multi-disciplinary approach 
to terrorism prevention, deterrence, response, and mitigation.  The crux of the program 
seeks to identify critical assets within the Los Angeles region, thus planning multi-
agency/multi-disciplinary prevention, deterrence, response, and consequence 
management activities accordingly. 
Archangel is similar in its mission to the TEW because the staff works to create 
Readiness Information Folders for key assets and critical infrastructure sites throughout 
the county.  One of the most important assignments carried out by Archangel is a 
prototype interoperable database for storage and sharing of critical information related to 
critical infrastructure protection and response.  The program is called Archangel Critical 
Asset Management System or ACAMS.  Once this program has been tested and approved 
it will be distributed for use by other high-risk municipalities. 
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On the surface these programs seem very effective, but they are new and 
traditional “turf issues” slow progress.  For example, although the three programs appear 
to be working together toward a common goal, they continue to be very protective of 
their individual accomplishments.  Also, many of the law enforcement representatives 
refuse to accept that fire service professionals have similar needs for information and 
intelligence. 
 
C. IMPEDIMENTS, GAPS, AND WEAKNESSES  
While it is apparent that the LAFD SOD represents a significant advance in 
counter-terrorism management, the effort is largely oriented to response strategies for 
events already in progress or over.  The central argument of this paper is that much more 
needs to be accomplished in the area of prevention strategies.  This challenges the LAFD 
to re-assess its traditional, reactive sensibility and institute a more pro-active leadership 
style.  There appear to be four primary impediments to achieving full leadership and 
innovation in terrorism prevention: culture, effective leadership, lack of line-level 
training and education programs, and lack of community participation.  
 
1. Culture 
There are many cultural factors that have impacted the timing and contours of 
previous prevention and public safety efforts in the fire service.   Some of those factors 
have had a negative influence on this effort; these include the service’s historical 
development; cultural issues of homogeneity, conformity, and “groupthink;” lack of 
staffing resources; and funding and scheduling challenges.  This chapter will discuss 
these influences in further detail with the intent of identifying barriers to the creation of a 
terrorism prevention program in the LAFD.  
Taking all of these programs into consideration, it appears the LAFD has come a 
long way to defend its community from terrorist attack.  But preparedness is much more 
than information sharing and collaboration.  Preparedness also includes intervention, 
threat recognition and risk management.   The LAFD has worked and planned in those 
areas that are familiar including tabletop and field exercises; incident command and 
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control; partnerships with allied agencies; the purchase of new equipment and technology 
to improve response capabilities and other common functions. 
Despite these actions, the LAFD has missed two critical components of 
preparedness: threat recognition and intervention.  It is difficult to prepare for what you 
cannot see or for what has not yet happened.  Allocating resources to identify an 
unknown enemy is risky.  There are several barriers that prevent administrators from 
focusing on all the components of preparedness; complacency, indifference, ignorance 
and conservatism keep administrators from engaging in a more well-rounded approach to 
dealing with terrorism. 
As mentioned above, the LAFD has made great strides toward defeating terrorism 
over the last few years; an inventory of new tools, equipment and staff testify to that.  A 
sense of complacency has set in as low level goals have been reached relatively quickly, 
and the department moves on to the next issue, expecting the same results.   
Few people on the west coast have been directly affected by terrorism, as there 
has not been a serious attack in this region.  The department’s focus is shifted on a daily 
basis to its routine concerns such as response times, budget hearings, and allegations of 
discrimination.  Finding money to prevent something from which we do not perceive a 
direct or immediate threat is overshadowed by more pertinent issues. 
There are programs and policies that attempt to prevent terrorist attacks from 
happening in the first place.  The states of Washington and New Jersey have been 
proactive in seeking out the operatives before they are able to strike.  ODP has stated that 
teaching responders to recognize threats will help to deter terrorism in our homeland; 
ignorance is no excuse to settle on response and recovery when there are options for 
prevention.  
“Conservatism associated with the bureaucratic structure and the cost of proposed 
innovations are also cited as factors that inhibit innovation,” according to the authors of 
Managing Fire Services.23  Prevention costs money.  Prevention is difficult to measure 
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International City Management Association, 1988), 408. 
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for effectiveness; and typically when a problem is solved, for example reductions in lives 
lost due to fire, resources are reallocated to other areas.  Perhaps these are some barriers 
to contend with, in addition to determining the obstacles to adopting prevention as a 
strategy. 
“First in, last out;” “Go hard or go home;” “L.A. City’s Finest;” these slogans are 
frequently heard among LAFD firefighters.  A look into the history of firefighting in 
America provides a context in which to understand these phrases and the attitudes they 
reflect.  
The earliest firefighters in America were volunteers.  It was not until March 10, 
1853, that the City of Cincinnati voted for a paid fire department, though in 1678 the city 
of Boston hired and paid one full-time “captain of the rig” to staff the first known fire 
engine in the United States.24 Prior to the Cincinnati initiative, volunteer fire companies 
existed in cities up and down the East coast, and quickly became tightly-knit social 
groups in their townships. These volunteer corps were characterized by tremendous pride, 
competitiveness, and influence both in their volunteer positions and as members of their 
communities.25  
This pride and competitiveness would later prove pivotal in the transformation 
from volunteer to paid fire departments.  Bitter rivalries became so intense that fistfights 
and riots were normal occurrences as fire companies jockeyed for position at 
conflagrations.26 It was then, and still is today, considered a disgrace to be beaten by 
another company responding to an incident.  In fact, fire companies were known to 
interfere with and sometimes trick other companies who might beat them to a blaze.  
Eventually business owners and residents grew tired of the volunteer firefighters’ 
mischief. A fire in a Cincinnati wood-planing mill in 1851 set into motion the events that 
led to the hiring of America’s first paid firefighters: the mill burned to the ground as more 
                                                 
24 Coleman and Granito (eds.), Managing Fire Services, 24. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Terry Golway, “Firefighters,” American Heritage Magazine (Nov./Dec. 2005),7. Available from 
http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2005/6/2005_6_36.shtml. (Accessed December 26, 
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than ten fire companies muscled for position.  Two years later the citizens of Cincinnati 
were successful in their efforts to prevent similar situations as city officials were forced 
to convert their fire forces to a paid department.27   
The 9/11 attacks on New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania directed much 
attention to the courage, sacrifice, and dedication to duty that firefighters exhibit in the 
face of almost certain death or injury. But before that horrific day “they certainly were 
worthy of admiration, for they were expected to respond instantly to an alarm, and more 
often than not, that meant leaving their homes at night, when more fires occur, and 
returning hours later – wet, cold, and exhausted, with no reward other than the admiration 
of fellow citizens and the camaraderie of their fellow firefighters.”28   
The firefighter of previous generations was one who primarily fought fires and on 
occasion performed a difficult rescue.29 Today’s fire professional has a much more 
complicated job.  First, incident types vary from emergency medical services, hazardous 
materials, and swift water rescues to confined space rescues, floods, and electrical 
problems.  Secondly, both natural and manmade disasters demand the time and attention 
of fire department training scenarios.  Finally, community involvement demands and 
station and apparatus maintenance responsibilities leave little time for prevention-related 
activities. A culture that espouses machismo, heroism, activity, and competition is 
antithetical – at least on the face of it – to the methodical, tedious, “quiet” tasks of 
prevention and education. Despite LAFD’s prior successes in fire prevention and 
outreach programs, there remains a deeply-rooted ethos that prefers action to thought, 
tactic to strategy, response to prevention, and putting out a blaze to anything else. 
 
2. Leadership, Training and Education 
David Butler was quoted in The Leadership Challenge: “You need to give people 
on the front lines proper vision and proper training, and then follow that up with 
                                                 
27 Coleman and Granito (eds.), Managing Fire Services, 24. 
28 Golway, “Firefighters,” 6. 
29 Gerald Loren Fishkin, Ph. D., Firefighter and Paramedic Burnout (Gardena, CA: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Legal and Professional Publications, Inc., 1989), 8. 
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responsibility so they can act on decisions.”30  This quote perfectly isolates two critical 
components that have been neglected by LAFD leadership.  First, no clear vision has 
been presented to personnel on the front lines to direct them, or even include them, in 
ongoing counterterrorism efforts.  Second, no training has been provided to line 
personnel, but rather has been offered only to captains, chiefs and partners from allied 
agencies.  For example, WMD and TLO training was given only to those members in the 
officers ranks. 
Kouzes and Posner identify in their book The Leadership Challenge five 
fundamental practices that enable leaders to get extraordinary things done: to challenge 
the process, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, model the way, and encourage 
the heart.31  Challenging the process involves changing the status quo, and creating 
prevention-based programs to deal with terrorism when response-based programs are the 
norm.  Leaders must inspire a shared vision – combating terrorism is not going to be 
accomplished by the efforts of the SOD alone.  Line personnel are valuable resources that 
want to participate, but not without vision, training and education.  John M. Bryson 
wrote: “Mission, in other words, clarifies an organization’s purpose; vision clarifies what 
it should look like and how it should behave as it fulfills its mission.”32  The current 
mission of the LAFD was written pre-9/11; updating it and clearly communicating a 
vision will better guide the LAFD toward a more secure future, free from terrorism.  
Enabling others to act, in this case, suggests that the LAFD should empower its 
workforce to get involved with this new mission.  By training and educating them to 
recognize threats they can interdict those threats in the planning stages.  Leaders go first; 
they model the way for others to follow.  The LAFD has accomplished a lot with the 
creation of the SOD, but should be frontrunner in the creation of a terrorism awareness 
program for first responders, citizens, and public works officials.  Leaders encourage the 
hearts of their constituents to carry on.  Just as the faculty and staff at the Center for 
                                                 
30 James Kouzes and Barry Posner, The Leadership Challenge (Boulder, CO: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1995), 12. 
31 Ibid, 9. 
32 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 3rd Edition (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 102. 
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Homeland Defense and Security encourage their students to fight the good fight, LAFD 
leaders need to encourage their workforce to participate in the battle against terrorism.    
 
3. No Community Participation 
Many successful community-based programs have been (or will be) discussed in 
this paper.  These programs have been recognized because they capitalized on the 
partnership between public servants and the citizens.  The LAFD has been successful in 
the past with its CERT and Adopt-a-Fire Station programs.  These two programs focused 
on solving problems for both parties while improving conditions for all involved.  
Furthermore, both programs empower the citizens and responders to enhance the quality 
of life in the community.  A terrorism awareness program will accomplish the same 
thing.  By teaching responders and citizens to recognize indicators of terrorist planning 
operations and how to report those operations, both the responders and citizens will 
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III. RELEVANT PREVENTION AND TERRORISM MODELS 
It is more cost-effective in terms of time, money, and lives to prevent attacks than 
to respond to them.  The citizens of the United States have benefited significantly from 
public awareness and injury prevention programs over the past thirty years. This chapter 
will examine three programs that have effectively solved community and organizational 
problems through the creation of productive partnerships: Community Oriented Policing 
(COP), Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.), and Community Emergency 
Response Teams (C.E.R.T.).  In addition, two current prevention-based antiterrorism 
programs – the Washington Statewide Homeland Security Plan and the New Jersey 
Office of Counterterrorism – offer a valuable template for incorporating terrorism 
prevention into the LAFD. 
 
A. COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING 
The U.S. Department of Justice defines community-oriented policing as 
collaboration between the police and the community to identify and solve community 
problems at the grassroots and causal level.33  Researchers at RAND determined that 
“such collaboration helps develop better relationships and mutual understanding between 
police officers and community members, which in turn help in solving community 
problems.”34 Indeed, the National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies citizens and 
first responders as the “concerted national effort” that will win the global war on terror.35  
The community policing philosophy is that police agencies should not only 
cooperate with citizens and communities, but should also actively solicit input and 
participation from them.36  The foundation of community policing comes from the early 
19th century, but COP originated out of an official federal program authorized under the 
                                                 
33 Russell W. Glenn, et al., Training the 21st Century Police Officer: Redefining Police 
Professionalism for the Los Angeles Police Department (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). 
34 Ibid, 92. 
35 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2. 
36 Glenn, Training the 21st Century Police Officer. 
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Violent Crime Act of 1994.37  Congress approved millions of dollars to increase staffing 
levels and to purchase technology for the prevention of crime.  Other prevention models 
existed before COP, including team policing and problem-oriented policing; COP placed 
greater emphasis on building community partnerships, however, and has remained the 
predominant model ever since. 
Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton has described Community Oriented 
Policing as “…the three Ps: partnership (with the community), problem solving (with the 
community), and prevention (of crime in the community).”38  As part of its community 
policing effort to improve citizen/police partnerships, the Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD) has created several programs that encourage cooperation between officers and 
citizens: Community-Police Advisory Boards; Senior Lead Officer Mentor Program; 
Area Senior Lead Officer Summits; Police and Community Collaborative Teams; 
Neighborhood Prosecutor Program; Neighborhood Council; Police Magnet Program; 
LAPD Online website; and the LA Community Policing website. These programs have 
continued to evolve since the 1990s and have improved community relations with the 
citizens while decreasing crime at the same time. 
The LAFD has adopted this philosophy and designed a robust community 
relations agenda. In an effort to cultivate positive relationships with the communities it 
serves, LAFD created the Adopt-a-Fire Station Program; Learn Not To Burn (School 
Outreach Program); Risk Watch; Junior Fire Setters; LAFD Online website; LA C.E.R.T. 
website; LAFD Fire Explorer Program; and the LAFD Bicycle Paramedic Program. The 
details of each of these programs is beyond the scope of relevance for this project, but the 
salient point is that the LAFD has exhibited through these initiatives an awareness of the 
indispensability of community outreach and partnership in any successful prevention 
campaign.  
                                                 
37 Niki Raapana, “Community Policing: What is community policing?”  The Anti-Communitarian 
League, April 2004, 4. Available from http://nord.twu.net/acl/commpolicing.html. Accessed 19 February 
2006. 
38 Glenn, Training the 21st Century Police Officer, 97. 
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These examples also highlight the imagination and creativity that have been 
tapped in the city of Los Angeles as a means of building strong partnerships between the 
community and public servants.  These relationships will prove useful as first responders 
search for innovative ways to prevent terrorist activity today and into the future. This is 
especially true considering the high level of public trust and cooperation necessary to 
detect, report, deter, and prevent potential terrorist activity in all its political and cultural 
sensitivity. 
The second “P” in Chief Bratton’s definition of community policing is problem- 
solving.  According to the RAND Corporation, “problem solving is the practical 
application of community policing.”39  Many different problem-solving models are used 
by police and fire departments throughout the country, but the most common model is 
called SARA, which stands for scanning for the problem, analyzing the specific elements 
of the problem, developing and implementing responses to the problem, and assessing 
the efforts made toward solving the problem.  Several important components of this 
model feature characteristics of problem solving and state: 
1. COP should be the standard operating method and not just an occasional 
project (in other words, must be institutionalized with funding, staffing, and 
integration); 
2. COP should be practiced by personnel throughout the ranks, not just by 
specialists and managers (in other words, requiring the participation of line-
level as well as leadership-level personnel); 
3. COP should be empirical in the sense that decisions are made on the basis of 
information gathered systematically (and that in the anti-terrorism context will 
require information collection and reporting mechanisms and protocols, as 
well as recognition and awareness training by relevant personnel); 
4. Whenever possible, COP should involve collaboration between police and 
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5. Whenever possible, COP should incorporate community input and 
participation so that it is the community’s problems that are addressed, rather 
than just those of the police departments.  Additionally, the community should 
share responsibility for its own protection.40 
The third “P” in Chief Bratton’s definition of COP is prevention.  COP strategy is 
more proactive and preventative than reactionary.  Several components of COP are 
prevention-based by virtue of encouraging community interaction with officers between 
responding to calls for service; encouraging officers to discover underlying problems and 
conditions instead of simply focusing on the individual incident; devoting more personnel 
to crime prevention as opposed to apprehension and detection of crimes; devoting 
officers to mentoring roles so that juveniles do not get involved in crime in the first 
place.41  
A compelling example of the consequences of NOT incorporating COP in any 
public program is the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program, which began in March of 2005 
and is not regarded as a successful program. Why? The TLO program meets only two of 
the five COP features. The fire department has not actively sought input from the 
community in its effort to gather and share information related to terrorist activity.  The 
initial training for the TLO program was offered to chief officers, fire, and emergency 
medical services captains, but to no line personnel. Lastly, department leadership has not 
identified the TLO program as standard operating procedure so the program has been 
viewed more as a special project. 
There are several components of the COP model that can be effectively 
incorporated into a terrorism prevention model for the LAFD.  The functional aspects of 
COP are that it is prevention-based, oriented to problem-solving, designed to foster 
collaboration between the community and first responders, supported by agency leaders 
and politicians, backed with financial support, indicative of the “concerted national 
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effort”(partnerships) mandated in the National Strategy, and creative and imaginative 
community-based programs.  All of the above functions have been the focus of such 
national recommendations as the 9/11 Commission Report, National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, and “America Burning.” The terrorism prevention training 
curriculum and model in Appendix A is predicated on the integration of all of these 
elements. 
 
B. DRUG ABUSE RESISTANCE EDUCATION 
The Drug Abuse Resistance Education Program (D.A.R.E.) was initiated in 1983 
in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) by then-Police Chief Daryl Gates.  
Chief Gates recognized that police officers were ill-prepared to stop the supply and abuse 
of illegal drugs sweeping across America.  The purpose, intention, and mission of 
D.A.R.E. were to educate students in Los Angeles schools about the dangers and 
consequences of drug use in order to prevent substance abuse among school age 
children.42 
With prevention as its foundation, the program set out to target children before 
they were affected by peer pressure toward experimentation with tobacco, drugs, and 
alcohol.  Moreover, the children interacted with police officers in a non-threatening and 
educational setting, thus improving the image of law enforcement officers in the 
community and building positive relationships.  
The D.A.R.E. program started at the beginning of the 1983-84 school term after 
Chief Gates received full cooperation from LAUSD.  Ten LAPD officers taught the new 
curriculum to more than 8,000 students in 50 Los Angeles elementary schools during that 
first year.  Two years later the program had grown and successfully reached all 345 
elementary schools, in addition to the 58 junior high schools in the city. 
Today, the U.S. Department of Justice reports that D.A.R.E. is a “validated, 
copyrighted, comprehensive drug and violence prevention education program for children 
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in kindergarten through 12th grade.”43  The project is coordinated by D.A.R.E. America 
and receives input from state and local agencies.  To date, the D.A.R.E. curriculum has 
been taught to more than 25 million elementary school students by over 22,000 
community oriented police officers in over 7,000 communities throughout the country.  
Additionally, D.A.R.E. is taught by law enforcement officers in nineteen countries and is 
being implemented in Department of Defense Dependent schools worldwide.44 
The objectives of D.A.R.E. are met by training carefully selected officers to teach 
a structured, sequential curriculum in schools.45  There are twelve critical program 
elements that have contributed to the success of the D.A.R.E. program, including joint 
planning, written agreement, officer selection, curriculum, classroom instruction, officer 
appraisal, informal officer-student interaction, teacher orientation, in-service training, 
parent education, and community presentations. 
Funding for the D.A.R.E. program comes from various providers.  A $478,000 
grant for five years was awarded to the State of California through the Office of Criminal 
Justice Planning.46 According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the U.S. Department 
of Justice provides federal discretionary funding to five D.A.R.E. Regional Training 
Centers for accreditation of state training facilities, training, and support of technical 
assistance.47 
There is every reason to believe that sufficient federal funding is available for 
training and education for first responders to increase awareness of terrorist planning 
activities. 
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Furthermore, D.A.R.E. serves as a good framework for the fire service to build on 
because it highlights an innovative grass-roots program that succeeded and flourished 
into a nationally-recognized protocol.  The leadership demonstrated by Chief Gates, in 
this case, greatly contributed to the success of the program; the mission and goals were 
clearly stated and known throughout the organization, which provided officers with the 
direction they needed to succeed.  Finally, funding was secured for training and 
sustainability.  
 
C. COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS IN LOS ANGELES 
Another successful prevention model is that of Community Emergency Response 
Teams (CERT).  The LAFD sent personnel to Japan in February of 1985 to study its 
extensive earthquake preparedness plans.  During the trip, the firefighters were surprised 
to learn that extensive steps had been taken to train entire communities in specific 
recovery operations – fire suppression, first aid, evacuation, and light search and rescue 
operations.  The premise of the teams’ creation was that they would alleviate the potential 
devastation following a major earthquake.48  
Based on the lessons learned from Japan, the LAFD developed a pilot program to 
train a neighborhood watch group in 1986.  The emphasis of the training was on basic 
fire suppression, light search and rescue operations, and basic first aid.  Various 
demonstrations and field training exercises with the 30-person team proved the concept 
was an effective one.  The tremendous need for this type of community training was 
underscored on October 1, 1987 when the Whittier Narrows earthquake hit Southern 
California.49  Shortly after the earthquake the LAFD rushed to action by creating the 
Disaster Preparedness Division.  The objectives of the division led by Chief Frank 
Borden were to educate and train the public and government sectors in disaster  
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preparedness; research, evaluate, and disseminate disaster preparedness information; and  
develop, train, and maintain a network of Community Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs).50 
Today CERT is taught by LAFD firefighters and paramedics to community 
groups, businesses and industry, and city government.  The volunteers are educated in 
disaster preparedness, fire safety, disaster medical operations (including triage and the 
treatment of life-threatening injuries), light search and rescue, team organization, disaster 
psychology, and terrorism.  The course is concluded by a day-long field training exercise 
where the volunteers must demonstrate skills.  The primary objective is to teach citizens 
self-sufficiency in order to optimize chances of survival until professional responders 
arrive on the scene.  Some of the benefits of the CERT program are increased community 
spirit, improved emergency skills for citizens during day-to-day emergencies, an 
enhanced bond between government and populace, and an increased overall level of 
public disaster readiness in Los Angeles.51 
Following the successes between the citizens of Los Angeles and its firefighters, 
FEMA decided in 1993 to make the concept and program available to communities 
nationwide.  The Emergency Management Institute, in cooperation with the LAFD, 
expanded the CERT materials to make them applicable to all hazards.  In January of 
2002, CERT became part of President Bush’s Citizen Corps, which is a unifying structure 
to link a variety of related volunteer activities to expand a community’s resources for 
crime prevention, counterterrorism efforts and emergency response.52 Additionally, 
Congress provides funds through Citizen Corps to states and territories, and grants from 
the funds may be available to local communities to start CERT programs.53  
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After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, FEMA recognized the need to expand the 
CERT program curriculum to include indicators of terrorism.  The final module of its 
curriculum is devoted to terrorism and discusses: 
• The definition of terrorism and terrorist goals,     
• The weapons terrorists are known or suspected to possess, and the risk posed 
by those weapons, 
• Cues to identify when a terrorist attack has occurred or may be imminent, and 
• CERT protocols for terrorist incidents and protective action following an 
event.54 
As respectable as FEMA’s curriculum is, not nearly enough citizens participate in 
the CERT program   Greater emphasis and participation in the CERT program in 
conjunction with first responder awareness training could greatly increase opportunities 
for threat recognition and interdiction of terrorist incidents.  Furthermore, an expanded 
curriculum for citizens could include such information as the definition of terrorism, what 
the terrorist threats are, how to identify that threat, and how to access a reporting 
mechanism if they did in fact recognize suspicious planning operations.  
 
D. THE WASHINGTON STATEWIDE HOMELAND SECURITY PLAN 
The State of Washington has been widely acknowledged in the homeland security 
field for its planning efforts.  The Washington Statewide Homeland Security Plan was 
developed by the Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division 
with input from state and local stakeholders.  The plan is both comprehensive and 
proactive, but the objectives and strategies are of particular interest to this work because 
they are prevention-based. The components of this plan most relevant to this thesis are 
threat reduction “anti-terrorism” activities highlighted in the following sections that 
mandate:  assisting and educating the private sector; improving threat recognition to halt 
the development of a terrorist threat before it is executed; and establishing a public and 
private community based pre-incident “threat indicator” training program.55   These 
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actions are exceptional because they focus on threat recognition and interdiction, which 
ODP describes as vital components of preparedness.  Most emergency response agencies 
focus their attention on response and recovery following an incident rather than on 
preventing it from occurring in the first place.   
Washington’s Homeland Security Plan has been cited as a smart practice because 
it is thorough and balanced.  The designers of this plan accessed their state homeland 
security structure for guidance on all aspects of preparedness before creating it.  As a 
result they did not focus more efforts on response and mitigation capabilities, but 
balanced their capabilities throughout.  
LAFD could use Washington’s plan as a model as it explores opportunities to 
educate the public regarding terrorism.  The private sector is a large resource pool that 
should be included in terrorism awareness, in addition to residents and responders.   
 
E. THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
The State of New Jersey has been a leader in counterterrorism through its New 
Jersey Office of Counterterrorism (OCT), a program initiated by executive order in 
January 2002 to “administer, coordinate, and lead the New Jersey counterterrorism and 
preparedness efforts with the goals of identifying, deterring, and detecting terrorist-
related activities.” 56  The OCT is broken down into four divisions including intelligence, 
investigations, critical infrastructure, and training, which is very similar to the LAFD 
SOD.  Both models incorporate initiatives recommended in the National Strategy, but 
OCT’s training division has instructed thousands of state, county, and local homeland 
security professionals in counterterrorism. The training curriculum emphasizes study in 
terrorist group tendencies, patterns, preferences, and conventions.  OCT has been 
successful because it fosters collaboration, information and intelligence sharing, risk 
management and assessment of CIP, and awareness training for first responders.57  The 
programs within the OCT deal more with pre-incident indicators and actions, where 
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LAFD has provided training that deals more with post-incident actions.  Although the 
two models are very similar in organization and function, LAFD could benefit from 
OCT’s training design which is balanced between state and regional terrorism awareness 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
39 
IV. FEDERAL GUIDANCE AND FRAMEWORKS 
Ample federal guidance exists to provide the frameworks and goals necessary to 
the design and implementation of any terrorism-prevention program. The salient 
documents are the previously-mentioned National Strategy and “America Burning,” as 
well as The Office of Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security: 
Prevention and Deterrence, and The Cycles of Preparedness.   
 
A. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY  
Following the attacks of 9/11, a considerable amount of research and strategic 
planning was conducted throughout the United States and at various levels of 
government.  These efforts produced a large amount of innovative thinking and valuable 
counter-terrorism protocols.  The most important of those documents are: 
• National Strategy For Homeland Security    [2002] 
• National Money Laundering Strategy     [2002] 
• National Drug Control Strategy      [2002] 
• National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction  [2002] 
• National Strategy For Combating Terrorism    [2003] 
• National Strategy For The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets        [2003] 
• National Strategy To Secure Cyberspace     [2003] 
• National Military Strategy      [2004] 
• National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States  [2005] 
• Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support   [2005] 
These strategies vary somewhat in their stated missions and objectives, but they 
share a common goal of eliminating or controlling global terrorism.  They universally 
underscore the need for a comprehensive set of guidelines by which federal, state, and 
local agencies can effectively join together to protect the security of the American 
population. 
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The most applicable and relevant strategy for the LAFD is the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security.  It asserts that non-military and non-law enforcement assets must 
now be applied to the detection, prevention and control of violent terrorist attacks carried 
out in non-traditional venues against civilian, non-combatant populations:  
The United States has long relied on national strategies to focus federal 
efforts on dealing with national security issues from fighting World War II 
to the war on drugs.  After 9/11, one of the first efforts of the Bush 
administration was to craft a family of strategies to guide the global war 
on terrorism.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security was perhaps 
the most important of these documents, providing a framework for how 
the federal government would organize domestic security activities.58  
 
In a letter dated July 16, 2002, President George W. Bush ordered the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, and said this:   
The National Strategy for Homeland Security is a beginning.  It calls for 
bold and necessary steps.  It creates a comprehensive plan for using 
America’s talents and resources to enhance our protection and reduce our 
vulnerability to terrorist attacks.  We have produced a comprehensive 
national strategy that is based on the principles of cooperation and 
partnership.  As a result of this Strategy, firefighters will be better 
equipped to fight fires, police officers better armed to fight crime, 
businesses better able to protect their data and information systems, and 
scientists better able to fight Mother Nature’s deadliest diseases.  We will 
not achieve these goals overnight…but we will achieve them.59 
 
In retrospect, the attacks of 9/11 awakened a new national awareness, perhaps 
reminiscent of the attack on Pearl Harbor some sixty years ago.  As before, the entire 
nation has been put on alert and each citizen has been called upon to contribute to the 
defense effort.  National guidelines have been drafted to inform the American public of 
our common interests in securing our homeland.  Within these guidelines and executive 
orders, there is a clear and unambiguous call to duty for non-traditional soldiers to  
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respond to the threat of terrorism:  the modern American fire service has been called 
upon to design and implement new public safety programs calculated to counter the 
terrorist threats. 
What this suggests is that firefighters and emergency medical personnel assigned 
to the LAFD are front-line soldiers in the war on terrorism.  If the LAFD accepts its new 
role, then a conscious decision must be made to detect, deter and prevent the violent loss 
of life, including that of the members of the department itself.  This challenge is most 
certainly a monumental departure from the traditional “fire house” mentality, and will 
force extraordinary change within the LAFD.  Failure to respond to this challenge, 
though, portends a calamity that might overshadow the events of September 11, 2001. 
Was the president sincere in his promise to fight terrorism by increasing the 
resources of local first responders?  Yes: For example, the LAFD alone has received over 
$40 million dollars from the federal government to better equip first responders.  These 
funds were allocated in a regional manner consistent with the goals of the National 
Strategy.  In very tangible ways, this funding has enhanced the safety of firefighters and 
increased their ability to deliver public safety services.  Table 2 depicts just how LAFD 





Table 2. LAFD Comparison with National Strategy Emergency Preparedness and 








Integrate separate federal              
response plans into a single all-
discipline incident management 
plan  
Tactical Training Section 
 
Homeland Security Planning 
Section 
NIMS certification pending, 
LAFD compliance underway 
 
Create a national incident 
management system  
Tactical Training Section Continued reliance on ICS, 
increased training and ICS 
development 
Improve tactical counter-terrorist 
capabilities  
 
Tactical Training Section  
 
Homeland Security Intelligence 
Section 
Ongoing programs including 
TEW, Archangel and TLO 
Enable seamless communications 
among all responders 
Bureau of Support Services Dedicated technical staff, 
updated communications 
equipment acquired (on line) 
Prepare health care providers for 
catastrophic terrorism 
Tactical Training Section 
 
Emergency Services Division 
Increased tabletop and field 
exercises 
Augment pharmaceutical and 
vaccine stockpiles  
Bureau of Emergency Services Increased field supplies, added mob
trailers 
Prepare for chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
decontamination  
Tactical Training Section 
 
In-Service Training Section 
Increased trained DECON staff, inc
mobile DECON units, provided WM
to all officers  
Plan for military support to civil 
authorities  
Tactical Training Section Increased tabletop and field  
exercises with armed services 
Build the “Citizen Corps” Disaster Preparedness Unit Expand existing CERT programs 
 
Implement the “First Responders 
Initiative of the Fiscal Year 2003 
Budget” 
Tactical Training Section UASI funding and other  
Grants are being administered 
Build the national training and 
evaluation system 
Tactical Training Section Regional and Tactical Training 
are working toward standardized  
training 
Enhance the victim support 
system  
Disaster Preparedness Unit Increased ambulance and 
paramedic staffing, 
enhanced rapid deployment 
capabilities and equipment 
43 
Again, these measures are largely based on response strategies for events already in 
progress.   
If the purpose of the National Strategy is to organize and mobilize assets to secure 
our homeland from terrorist attacks, then public safety agencies like the LAFD need to 
re-evaluate their current practices.  For example, the LAFD deploys firefighters and 
emergency medical personnel on hundreds of occasions throughout the city on a daily 
basis.  These “routine” calls for service are actually opportunities to observe and detect 
circumstances and conditions that might indicate a pre-attack terrorist activity.  If LAFD 
personnel were properly trained and capable of making important on-scene observations, 
there is a good probability that such observations, coupled with effective 
communications, might detect, deter, or prevent a violent terrorist attack.  Such a practice 
would be simple, unobtrusive, and comparatively inexpensive.   
According to the National Strategy’s framework, there are six homeland security 
missions relevant to the LAFD: Intelligence and Warning, Borders and Transportation, 
Domestic Counter-Terrorism, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Catastrophic Terrorism 
Defense, and Emergency Preparedness and Response.  Many of these functions have 
been addressed by the LAFD as noted in Table 2. 
The first three concentrate on pre-attack or preventative interventions.  If these 
three missions were fully successful, the remaining three would logically have a 
diminished role in the overall strategy.  The fourth and fifth missions clearly focus on 
existing vulnerabilities.  The sixth mission addresses the classic post-attack response in 
terms of minimizing, managing, and recovering from a critical event.  It should be noted 
that public safety agencies, including the LAFD, have a timeworn practice of dividing 
work assignments into regional or topical elements and then attempting to allocate 
sufficient resources to accomplish the entire objective.  This approach seems inadequate 
within the new terrorism parameter.  For example, it would be far more prudent and 
effective to allocate resources to prevent the event rather than simply to respond to that 
which has already occurred.  If this strategic axiom were to be observed, then the 
allocation of resources could be more precisely and effectively managed. 
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The concept that prevention is more effective than response is not new.  It is a 
widely accepted practice in the insurance industry, law enforcement, modern medicine, 
and even the fire service.  LAFD personnel are already completing fire prevention 
inspections within their jurisdictions.  The idea here is to alter the inspection procedures 
to include those indicators of terrorist planning.  In addition to the typical observations of 
fire extinguishers, blocked exits and extension cords, the author suggests that firefighters 
be taught to recognize situations that are out of the ordinary: For example, stockpiles of 
chemicals would be out of place in a garment warehouse.  Such awareness training falls 
perfectly under the Tactical Training Section’s program criteria. 
 
B. AMERICA BURNING 
In 1971 the cost of destructive fire in the United States amounted to $11.4 billion 
annually.  Industry professionals were frustrated because the richest and most 
technologically advanced nation in the world led all industrialized countries in per capita 
deaths and property loss from fire.60  In that same year, the injury rate for firefighters was 
recorded at 39.6%;175 firefighters died in the line of duty, an additional 89 firefighters 
died of heart attacks, and 26 firefighters died of lung disease related to smoke inhalation 
from firefighting.61 
 
Property loss $2,700,000,000 
Fire department operations $2,500,000,000 
Burn injury treatment $1,000,000,000 
Operating cost of insurance industry $1,900,000,000 
Productivity loss  $3,300,000,000 
TOTAL $11,400,000,000 
 
Table 3. Estimated Annual U. S. Fire Costs in 1971 (From: “America Burning” 2.) 
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It was in response to these dire statistics that the National Commission on Fire 
Prevention and Control was funded by Congress in 1971.  The main purpose of the 
Commission was to study the fire problem in America and to make recommendations 
“whereby the Nation can reduce the destruction of life and property caused by fire in 
cities, suburbs, communities, and elsewhere.”62  Legislation drafted within the report 
established the parameters for the commission’s areas of study: technological advances, 
construction techniques, and inspection procedures; the federal government’s 
involvement in decreasing the number of destructive fires; existing methods of fire 
suppression; fire department recruiting efforts; firefighter training programs; techniques 
for fire communications; assessment and standardization of firefighting equipment; fire 
department administrative structure; and means for federal, state, and local governments 
to reduce fire losses. 
The Commission then set goals to decrease deaths, injuries, and property losses 
by 50% within a ten-year time span: it concluded that the goal could be attained if there 
were a 5% decline per year.  Next, the Commission recommended a number of actions to 
be taken by government and industry that would cost little or nothing. It recognized, 
however, that the federal government would have to participate financially if those lofty 
goals were to be achieved.  Moreover, educational programs would have to be created so 
the public would understand fire prevention and coping with fire incidents.   
In the end, $150 million was requested for a five-year trial.  The accomplishments 
of the Commission were projected as follows:  a total saving of 8,000 lives; a total 
reduction of injuries by 210,000, $1.9 billion savings in property losses; and $85 million 
savings in hospital and medical expenses.63    
In order to address these concerns the Commission made two recommendations: 
that Congress establish a United States Fire Administration to provide national focus for 
the Nation’s fire problem and to promote a comprehensive program with adequate 
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funding to reduce life and property loss from fire; and that a national fire data system be 
established to provide a continuing review and analysis of the entire fire problem.64  
 
C. OFFICE OF DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY:  PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE 
No framework does more to emphasize the value of awareness regarding the 
enemy than The Office of Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security: 
Prevention and Deterrence.  Just one year following the September 11th attacks ODP 
began an in-depth “task analysis.”65  The foundation of this process stemmed from the 
weight placed on prevention as outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security: 
“deter all potential terrorists from attacking America through our uncompromising 
commitment to defeating terrorism wherever it appears; detect terrorists before they 
strike; prevent them and their instruments of terror from entering our country; and take 
decisive action to eliminate the threat they pose... Prevention, if it is to be effective, 
begins before a response is necessary.”66  
ODP was successful in designing a framework for prevention based on its 
extensive task analysis.  A final set of guidelines constitutes the general activities, 
objectives, and elements that organizations and those in command positions within the 
organizations should consider in the development of prevention plans.  The guidelines are 
divided into the functional categories of Collaboration, Information Sharing, Threat 
Recognition, Risk Management, and Intervention.  The following are recommendations 
taken from the guidelines that are of particular relevance to this work. 
Jurisdictions seeking to improve collaboration between and among public and 
private sector agencies to prevent WMD terrorism should:  recognize that there is a need 
for prevention activities and actions and that prevention is critical to a jurisdiction’s 
preparation for terrorism; use community-policing initiatives, strategies, and tactics as a 
basis to identify suspicious activities related to terrorism; coordinate federal, state, and 
                                                 
64 “America Burning,” 2.  
65 National Strategy, 2. 
66 Ibid.  
47 
local information, plans and actions for assessments, prevention procedures, 
infrastructure protection, and funding priorities to address prevention; and exercise 
prevention and collaboration measures. 
Jurisdictions seeking to improve “Threat Recognition” to halt the development of 
a WMD terrorism threat before it is executed should train law enforcement personnel and 
others (e.g., fire, EMS, PW, HC, social services, etc.), using standard definitions, criteria, 
and terms to recognize as clearly as possible the behavioral, observable, and legal criteria 
to recognize  what constitutes suspicious terrorist activities.  Finally, jurisdictions seeking 
to improve “Intervention” to stop terrorists before they can execute a threat should train 
personnel to recognize threats and threatening cues and to respond appropriately to 
suspects preparing for attacks.67 
The purpose of identifying these particular guidelines is that they represent the 
gaps in preparedness the LAFD has neglected in its counter-terrorism activities.  
Collaborative relationships and information sharing protocols have been appropriately 
cultivated, but threat recognition protocols, intervention procedures, and risk 
management functions have been deficient.  These deficiencies will all be addressed in 
first responder and citizen awareness training programs. 
 
D. THE CYCLES OF PREPAREDNESS 
Dr. William Pelfrey of ODP goes further to shape these five functional categories 
into a more detailed framework – one that is conceptualized as a cycle.  In “The Cycles of 
Preparedness:  Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist Threats,” Pelfrey 
explains that a cycle is useful “as a proxy for a dynamic, flexible, and continuous process 
of interaction and integration, and functioning as a self-organizing mechanism that 
improves preparedness for anticipated events and for the unimagined events.”68  
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Furthermore, he argues that preparedness is not a “vision that has been clearly articulated 
or swiftly adopted” due to the lack of direction written within the plethora of strategies 
and directives.69 
 
Figure 1.   From: Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, “The 
Cycles of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats,” 3. 
  
This diagram is informative because it signifies early actions in collaboration, 
information sharing, threat recognition, risk management, and intervention will eliminate 
the need for emergency response.  The most prevalent gaps in LAFD’s efforts again 
appear to be in threat recognition, risk management, and intervention. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The National Strategy clearly identifies the strategic objectives of homeland 
security in priority order.  First, terrorist attacks must be prevented in the United States.  
Second, we all must work to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism.  Finally, we 
must minimize the damage and be able to recover from terrorist attacks that do occur.70  
The LAFD has devoted significant attention to reducing vulnerabilities within the city 
and to minimizing damage by improving security of its critical infrastructure.  Great 
progress has been made in recovery efforts with the purchase of mobile command 
vehicles, urban search and rescue trucks, and hazardous materials squads and equipment.  
Because so much effort has been devoted to the second and third strategic 
objectives, preventative measures have been overlooked.  In order to strengthen the 
overall preparedness of the LAFD’s anti-terrorism efforts, more proactive programs will 
be necessary.  Based on this fact, the final recommendations of this thesis are to 1) 
rewrite and distribute a new department vision that incorporates solutions to the challenge 
of terrorism; and 2) develop and implement both a terrorism awareness training program 
and prevention-based training programs for both first responders and citizens.  These 
recommendations should be developed and implemented by the Special Operations 
Division through the Tactical Training Section within the Special Projects Unit.  
 
A. DEPARTMENT VISION 
Increased demands upon the fire service require more focused and coordinated 
strategic planning.  At one time the fire service was responsible only for fire suppression 
activities.  Now, emergency medical services are the bulk of the call load handled by first 
responders.  Several other specialized skills have received even greater attention since the 
events of 9/11, such as hazardous materials identification and confined space and urban 
search and rescue operations.  A clearly defined vision of the new direction in which the 
LAFD is headed will assist to organize and mobilize the workforce toward one common 
goal.  At present the LAFD is guided by a mission statement that was written before the 
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attacks on September 11th.  Much has changed in the world since the twentieth century 
and updated goals and objectives will more effectively guide the organization now and 
well into the future. 
 
B. TERRORISM AWARENESS TRAINING PROGRAM 
The LAFD has accepted that they have a role to play in the global war on terror.  
Weapons of mass destruction training and radiological monitoring equipment are not 
enough to arm them for the twenty-first century threat of terrorism.  The department has 
over 3,500 personnel, including firefighters, paramedics and emergency medical 
technicians who respond to more than 1,100 emergency calls each day.  Nearly 200 fire 
inspectors conduct approximately 1,600 fire inspections daily.  This work force needs a 
solid understanding of terrorist planning activities in order to predict, deter or interrupt a 
man-made attack. 
Educating first responders, citizens and public works employees will prove 
immensely helpful to enhancing security in the homeland.  Increasing the overall 
awareness of terrorist operations; organizations and motivations; resources required for 
terrorists to carry out their attacks; and techniques used by terrorists will improve the 
opportunity to interdict an attack before it can be initiated.  A basic curriculum has been 
included in the Appendix of this paper that addresses the origins and definitions of both 
domestic and international terrorism.  Terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States 
between 1992 and 2001 are discussed along with attacks that took place in Los Angeles, 
including strikes against a Jewish community center, an Internal Revenue Services 
building, and a ticket counter at the Los Angeles International Airport.   
Why do terrorists strike?  A common misconception is that terrorists attack 
because they are poorly educated and perhaps even crazy.  Research in this project 
uncovered true motivations which are largely religious, political, or economic.  A profile 
of those who carry out the attacks is equally important for responders to know.  The 
curriculum identifies the various adversary groups:  ideological, domestic, left-wing, 
right-wing, special interest, international, Islamic Extremists and state sponsors of 
terrorism.  It also discusses their tactics:  bombing, assassination, hijacking, kidnapping 
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and hostage taking, ambushes, sabotage, antiaircraft missiles, arson, maritime, 
industrial/infrastructure attack, and the rapidly growing tactic of suicide terrorism. 
Los Angeles is the fourth largest city in the country and has a wide array of 
vulnerabilities and potential targets from which criminals may choose.  Responders 
should be aware of commonly targeted locations so that suspicious activities occurring 
around those sites may be recognized.  The awareness curriculum lists several terrorist 
targets: federal, state, and local government buildings; mass transit facilities; public 
buildings and assembly areas; controversial businesses; communication and utility 
facilities; water supply facilities; research facilities and other locations where large 
groups of people congregate. 
Emergency responders need an understanding of strategies used by terrorists so 
that effective counter-measures may be developed.   Nine strategic goals are listed in the 
Appendix, including intimidation, destruction, acquisition, extortion or demand, 
influence, overreaction, revenge and reciprocity, satisfaction and survival.  Dialogue 
about situational awareness concludes the course.   
 
C. MORE PREVENTION-BASED PROGRAMS 
People on the front lines need policies and procedures to guide them and keep 
them safe in this challenging September 12th era.  The LAFD would benefit in the short-
term to incorporate the Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombings Incidents Course 
prepared by the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology and sponsored by the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  Among other things, this course teaches 
emergency responders how to recognize the nine phases of suicide bombing attack; legal 
and personal protection issues; and information collection and management/indicators 
and warnings. 
Annual Division Evaluation Training conducted by the LAFD focuses on the 
manipulation of frequently used firefighting tools and equipment such as hose, ladders, 
saws and personal protective equipment.  Federal grant funding has allowed the purchase 
of many new technologies and equipment for use when responding to incidents of 
terrorism.  However, not much training has accompanied these tools and technologies.  
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Division Evaluation is an ideal forum for practice and evaluation of this new equipment.  
Traditional stations focusing on laddering, saw manipulation and hose lays can be 
replaced with radiological monitoring equipment, patient transportation devices and auto-
injector use. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness Guidelines for Prevention and Deterrence clearly assert the need for fire 
service personnel to become actively engaged in terrorism prevention.  To date, the 
LAFD has made significant progress toward improving response to incidents of 
terrorism.  This has been accomplished through the implementation of the Special 
Operations Division and the sections within it, such as Homeland Security Intelligence, 
Homeland Security Planning and Tactical Training.  The work done thus far has 
improved response capabilities mainly through increased participation in multi-
agency/multi-disciplinary tabletop and field exercising; increased information and 
intelligence sharing with internal personnel and external law enforcement, public health, 
political representatives, security and private sector stakeholders; and by supplemental 
federal funding for the acquisition of equipment and technology. 
The efforts listed above represent some of the programs that have already been 
completed by the LAFD, and these efforts have been successful as far as they go. 
However, further terrorism prevention-related programs will be difficult to establish 
because of cultural impediments, which will not be overcome unless all the criteria of 
COP are implemented:  community participation; a known and shared vision throughout 
the rank and file; administrative, line-level and political support; sufficient long-term 
funding; comprehensive training and education; focused in prevention and problem-
solving oriented. 
In addition to this, LAFD administrators will be required to accept that the single 
best method of defeating terrorism is by educating its personnel (as well as the public) 
about how to recognize the roles and motivations of individual terrorists, their cell 
systems, fundraising, and the street-level mechanics of terrorist operations.  Department 
leadership must resist complacency by simply accepting that responding is the only 
option. Accepting two fundamental leadership practices, inspiring a shared vision and 
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enabling others to act will support a common homeland security vision.  This means 
gaining a line-level commitment and participation of firefighters, paramedics and 
inspectors, along with adequate funding and staffing, will pave the way for preventing 
terrorist attacks from occurring in Los Angeles and in neighboring jurisdictions. 
Based on what the LAFD already has established in the terrorism arena, it appears 
that what it lacks is an awareness training program for line-level personnel. The most 
appropriate setting for that would be in the SOD. In addition to the curriculum content as 
described previously in this thesis and later in the Appendix, this program would do well 
to take advantage of the successes in prevention programs and terrorism-related programs 
elsewhere, including DARE, CERT, Washington and New Jersey. A successful program 
would need to accord with the frameworks and guidance as set by DHS in the National 
Strategy and by ODP in its guidelines.  
Specifically, this means the curriculum must clearly define terrorism to LAFD 
personnel, and then discuss terrorist ideologies, motivations, targets, tactics and 
strategies.  In the Art of War the military strategist Sun Tzu underscores the importance 
of one thing in particular: “One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be 
endangered in a hundred engagements.  One who does not know the enemy but knows 
himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat.  One who knows 
neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.”71 
Simply put, terrorists are strategic actors – their operations are observable, their 
preparations can be detected, and attacks can be stopped before they begin if emergency 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Just as fire behavior is observable, terrorist planning actions and behaviors are 
observable as well.  Firefighters train to recognize certain conditions that warn of 
backdraft, flashover, or rollover; we do so to ensure our safety and the safety of others in 
the most dangerous of environments.  The twenty-first century fire service professional is 
challenged by an entirely new danger – that of terrorist attack.  We can reduce the danger 
of terrorism through education and training, as we have in hazardous materials 
identification, ventilation operations, and structure firefighting. 
In The Terrorist Recognition Handbook, Malcolm Nance claims “The single best 
method of defeating terrorism is educating our first responders, law enforcement 
personnel, military, and security professionals (as well as the public) about how to 
recognize the roles and motivations of individual terrorists, their cell systems, and the 
street-level mechanics of terrorist operations.” This Appendix identifies the specific 
curriculum components necessary for educating first responders with a basic foundation 
on terrorism and terrorism awareness. It suggests delivery mechanisms for the curriculum 
that are designed to be flexible to particular departmental and jurisdictional needs.  A 
reading list draws together some of the most important texts on terrorism – on which the 
curriculum is built – and serves as a reference for professionals who desire to do further 
research. A partial sample of the curriculum demonstrates the kinds of information any 
curriculum should contain. Finally, a list of existing training programs and websites is 
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There are many different avenues through which to provide training and 
education to a workforce.  Many factors will have a role in what option is best for a 
certain department, such as budget, time, available expertise, training location, and 
materials.  The recommendation for the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) is that 
terrorism awareness training be designed and implemented by the Special Operations 
Division (SOD), the organization within the LAFD that addresses counterterrorism 
operations and has a Special Projects Unit that can handle this task.  Some fire 
departments may not have a separate counterterrorism division to accomplish this project, 
but most modern fire departments have training divisions, fire/EMS academies, and other 
venues and platforms for distributing training materials to its personnel.   
The LAFD uses several mechanisms for providing training and education to its 
members: Training Bulletins, Training Alerts, and Department Bulletins are the primary 
written forms of communication; a newer forum is the compact disc or digital video 
series that each station has in its station library accompanied with a written lesson plan 
for station-based training.  Simulation training is becoming more and more popular in the 
fire service and is an excellent forum for awareness training.  A department-wide seminar 
is a fairly inexpensive means of providing training to members on their day off so they 
can attend at their own discretion and at no salary cost to the department.  Internet-based 
training is another avenue to provide awareness training to first responders.  Finally, 
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annual training sessions are perfect for incorporating terrorism-related scenarios, tool and 
equipment evaluations, and updates on current threats and trends. This curriculum lends 
itself easily to any one these delivery vehicles and forms. 
III. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Whether the LAFD or any other fire department uses the exact curriculum 
information provided in Section IV below, every terrorism and terrorism awareness 
training program should contain at a minimum these modules: 
A.  Defining Terrorism 
1. Background 
2. Terrorist Incidents 
 
B. Terrorist Threats  
1. Groups 
2. Motivations 
3. Tactics  
  
C. Terrorist Strategies 
1. Objectives  
  
D. Terrorist Tactics   
1. Bombing 










12. Suicide Terrorism  
 
E.  Terrorist Targets  
1. Selection 
2. Categories 
3. Indicators and Reportable Items 
4. Managing the Risks 
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IV. SUGGESTED CURRICULUM  
 
A. DEFINING TERRORISM 
 
 First responders do much more than just fight fires; their training encompasses 
countless hours training in structure firefighting techniques, emergency medical services 
treatment, hazardous materials response, confined space rescue and more.  Many hours 
are spent learning how to identify the various building construction components 
encountered by firefighters.  Fire prevention inspections are conducted regularly so that 
first responders may become familiar with occupancies within their jurisdictions that 
store dangerous chemicals. One of the greatest threats firefighters now face is also one to 
which little time has been devoted: identifying and preventing terrorism. 
 This section will briefly discuss some of the more publicized and recent terrorist 
incidents, provide various government definitions of terrorism, and discuss the 
characteristics of terrorism. 
Background 
 According to Bruce Hoffman, the word “terrorism” was first popularized during 
the French Revolution.72 More recently than the 1700s, however, Americans have been 
affected by terrorist incidents in this country and abroad. From small bombings in 
Europe, South America, and Asia to the attack against U.S. Marines in Beirut and the 
                                                 
72 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998), 15. 
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downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, U.S. citizens, businesses and 
government facilities, including embassies and military facilities, have been targets of 
terrorism.73 
 February 28, 1993 marks the first attack by international terrorists on U.S. soil.  A 
group of foreign terrorists detonated a bomb in the parking garage of the World Trade 
Center in New York City, killing six people and injuring more than 1,000. Since then, 
there have been several more attacks on U.S. soil. Among the most egregious:  
 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) arson attack, Michigan (1992) 
 Attempted bombing of the IRS facility in Nevada (1995)  
 Ricin possession, Virginia (1995) 
 Oklahoma City Bombing of the Murrah Federal Office Building (1995) 
 Amtrak derailment, Arizona (1995) 
 Bomb attack on FBI Field Office, Texas (1996) 
 Numerous bomb attacks in Atlanta (1996-97) 
 Attacks on World Trade Center and Washington (2001)74 
 Terrorist activity is not uncommon in the city of Los Angeles; four noteworthy 
cases have occurred since 1988, and are significant because LAFD personnel responded 
to all incidents, with the exception of the thwarted plot at the U.S.-Canadian border: 
On or about September 19, 1988, in Los Angeles, California, within the Central 
District of California, defendant DEAN HARVEY HICKS, maliciously and 
intentionally damaged and attempted to damage or destroy, by means of fire and 
                                                 
73 New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings 
Performance Level Direct/Indirect Course Participant Guide, (New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology, New Mexico, 2004), 2-3. 
74 New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings 
Performance Level Direct/Indirect Course Participant Guide, (New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology, New Mexico, 2004),  2-4. 
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an explosive device, a building possessed, used by, and leased in part, to the 
United States of America, specifically offices of the Internal Revenue Service, at 
11500 West Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, California.  On such date, defendant 
Hicks attempted to damage and destroy the commercial building located at the 
address by triggering a car bomb…wired to explode with high explosives.  On or 
about February 22, 1990, in Los Angeles, California, within the Central District 
of California, defendant DEAN HARVEY HICKS, maliciously and intentionally 
damaged and attempted to damage or destroy, by means of fire and an explosive 
devices, a building possessed, used by, and leased in part, to the United States of 
America, specifically offices of the Internal Revenue Service, at 11500 West 
Olympic Blvd. Los Angeles, California.  On such date, defendant Hicks attempted 
to damage and destroy the commercial building located at that address by 
triggering a truck bomb, parked across the street from the commercial building 
located at 11500 West Olympic Blvd., which was loaded with approximately 
2,000 pounds of high explosives, Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil.75 
 
 The citation above represents the two criminal complaints charged against the 
defendant Mr. Hicks.  The first incident, described as a car bomb, was located in the 
parking garage of the IRS building.  The car was filled with Ammonium Nitrate pipe 
bombs, gasoline containers, and Clorox bottles filled with ammonia and bleach.  LAPD 
bomb squad technicians also determined that the car was booby-trapped.  A fire broke out 
in the car following detonation, to which LAFD fire companies responded and 
extinguished the fire.76 
 The February 1990 incident was a truck bomb filled with mortar launchers and 
approximately 2,000 pounds of Ammonium Nitrate in 55-gallon containers.  This vehicle 
was parked outside the IRS building in order to project the mortar launchers up and into 
the building.  After several mortars were fired, the truck caught fire and LAFD fire 
companies again responded and extinguished it before the containers of Ammonium 
                                                 
75 U.S. District Court v. Dean Harvey Hicks, (Criminal Complain, US District Court Central District 
of California, 1991), http://www.tkb.org/CaseHome.jsp?caseid=368 [Accessed November 8, 2005] 2. 
76 Ibid., 5. 
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Nitrate could explode.  No injuries resulted from either incident, but LAPD bomb experts 
predicted that had the truck bomb exploded it would have destroyed two city blocks.77 
 On August 10, 1999, Buford Furrow walked into the North Valley Jewish 
Community Center in Granada Hills, California and opened fire with an automatic rifle.  
Four young children and a woman were injured by the known white supremacist.  Furrow 
fled the scene on foot only to fatally shoot a Filipino-American postal worker.  Furrow 
later turned himself in to the FBI in Las Vegas, Nevada and said he wanted his act to be 
“a wake-up call to America to kill Jews.”78  In his confession to the FBI, Furrow referred 
to the U.S. Postal Service worker as a “good target of opportunity” because he was non-
white.79 
 In late December of 2000, Ahmed Ressam of Algeria attempted to cross the 
Canadian border into the United States at Port Angeles, Washington.  An astute border 
agent noticed Ressam was visibly nervous and after questioning him ordered a search of 
his car.  The trunk was filled with 40 kilograms of explosives and detonators which 
Ressam later confessed were to be used for a terrorist operation at Los Angeles 
International Airport (LAX).  In his confession, Ressam said he chose LAX “because an 
airport is sensitive politically and economically” and because the United States was “the 
biggest enemy” of Islam.80  
                                                 
77 Ibid., 8.  
78 EmergencyNet News Service, “Shooting at Jewish Community Center in Los Angeles,” (August 10, 
1999), http://www.emergency.com, [Accessed November 8, 2005], 4. 
79 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “U.S.A. v. Buford Furrow:  99-CR-838,” 
http://www.tkb.org/CaseHome.jsp?caseid=421 [Accessed November 8, 2005], 1. 
80 Mark A. Sauter and James Jay Carafano, Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, 
Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2005), 29. 
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 Finally, on July 4, 2002, Heshem Mohamed Ali-Hadayet walked up to the El Al 
Airlines ticket counter in LAX and began to fire.  A struggle between Hadayet and two El 
Al security guards ensued before two people were killed and four others injured; Hadayet 
was shot and killed in the incident as well.81 Upon further investigation, the FBI 
determined the attack to be a terrorist act. 
 These local and national incidents have claimed the lives of nearly 3,500 
Americans, causing federal, state, and local governments to initiate programs to prepare 
responders for and prevent incidents of terrorism.  Over $30 million has been spent by the 
LAFD toward the purchase of specialized equipment, weapons of mass destruction 
training, and intelligence collection capabilities alone. At least one area remains in order 
to achieve this goal: the training of those who are (and will continue to be) the first to 
prevent or respond to acts of terrorism in recognizing its signs and understanding what 
they face in the post-9/11 world. 
What Is Terrorism? 
 One thing terrorism experts agree on is that there is no single, universally-
accepted definition of terrorism. In Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction, Charles 
Townshend says, “terrorism appears to be a state of mind rather than an activity.”82  
Hoffman cites in his work that, “while the tactics and targets of terrorists and lone 
assassins are often identical, their purpose is not.”83 Understanding that every agency and 
                                                 
81 Violence Policy Center, “Fact Sheet on the Los Angeles International Airport Shooting and 
Statistics on Firearms Violence in California,” (July 4, 2002), http://www.vpc.org, [Accessed November 9, 
2005] 1. 
82 Charles Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 3. 
83 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998), 41. 
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organization uses its own operational definition of terrorism, these are the more common 
definitions: 
¾ The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives: Federal Bureau of Investigation.84 
 
¾ The calculated use or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or 
intimidate governments or societies: United States government.85 
 
¾ Premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence 
an audience: USC Title 22 Section 2656f(d).86   
 
¾  The unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals 
or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve 
political, religious, or ideological objectives: US Department of Defense.87 
 
 There are many more definitions of terrorism than these; what is more important 
for a first responder to know are the common components, or characteristics of 
terrorism, which according to Hoffman include: ineluctably political aims and 
motives; violence – or, equally important, threats of violence; designed to have far-
reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; 
conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial 
cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and 
perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.88  
                                                 
84 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998), 38. 
85  Charles Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002)3. 
86 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998), 38. 
87 Ibid., 38. 
88 Ibid., 43. 
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 Similarly, Sauter and Carafano have synthesized the various definitions of 
terrorism and narrowed them to these central elements:  terrorism is conducted by 
sub-national groups; is targeted at random noncombatant victims; directed at one set 
of victims in part to create fear among a larger audience; is aimed at coercing 
governments or populations; planned to get publicity; motivated by political, 
ideological, or religious beliefs; and is based on criminal actions (actions that would 
also violate the rules of war).89 
B. CURRENT THREATS  
 
 The increase in terrorist incidents abroad has caused the Los Angeles Fire 
Department to initiate programs and procedures to prepare emergency personnel to deal 
with terrorist attacks initiated locally.  The first step toward preparing first responders for 
incidents of this kind is to teach them the nature of the threat—specifically, who the 
enemy is, and their motives and abilities.90   
 According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, “in the war on 
terrorism, the more we know about our enemy the better able we are to defeat that 
enemy.”91 This section will identify current threats and tactics used by specific terrorist 
groups that jeopardize our national security.  First responders will be better prepared to 
combat terrorism once they know how to identify terrorists and what motivates them to 
attack.  According to Bruce Hoffman, “the identity of these new types of adversaries is 
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also significant in terms of the countermeasures that the government, military, police 
[firefighters], and security services can employ against them.”92 
 There are many terrorist groups that harbor grievances against the United States; 
however, “Al Qaeda remains America’s most immediate and serious threat despite our 
successes in disrupting its network in Afghanistan and elsewhere.”93 Further, the federal 
government has named religious extremist movements in the Middle East and South Asia 
as the “most dangerous” international terrorist organizations.94  Other significant threats 
have stemmed from domestic extremist groups, including the National Alliance, Aryan 
Nation, and the Puerto Rican separatists Los Macheteros.  
 The following is a breakdown of the various groups that have and will continue to 
pose the most serious threats to the homeland.  The analysis is provided as a means to 
equip first responders with the knowledge needed to recognize the enemy among us.   
 
IDEOLOGICAL TERRORIST GROUPS 
 Simply put, an ideology is a set of values or principles – a belief system – that 
may motivate people to act.95 Some of the more common ideologies associated with 
terrorism are politically or religiously based.  Other ideologies, such as white supremacy, 
are based on hate and fear.  This section will identify the widespread groups that 
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emergency responders should be aware of as they develop more comprehensive 
counterterrorism programs designed to mitigate the terrorist threat. 
Domestic Terrorists  
 Domestic terrorists are groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely 
within the U.S. and Puerto Rico without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at 
elements of the U.S. Government or population.  Perhaps the most memorable example 
of domestic terrorism is the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995.96 Timothy McVeigh 
used approximately 4800 pounds of explosives to kill 168 Americans when he bombed 
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. 
 
Left-wing Terrorists 
  Left-wing domestic terrorists are defined as, “terrorists that are out to destroy 
capitalism and replace it with a communist or socialist regime.”97  The New Mexico 
Institute of Mining and Technology describes left-wing terrorism in its Incident Response 
to Terrorist Bombings course as: 
…groups that generally profess a revolutionary socialist doctrine and view 
themselves as protectors of the American people against capitalism and 
imperialism.  They aim to bring about a change in the U. S. and believe that this 
can only be accomplished through revolution, such as well-orchestrated criminal 
actions rather than participation in the established political process.98 
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The following is a list of the motivations and tactics of left-wing terrorist groups: 
 MOTIVATIONS 
¾ Revolutionary socialist doctrine 
¾ Protectors against capitalism    





 Experts say the only left-wing terrorist group still active is the Puerto Rican 
separatists, but their activities have scaled back drastically over the years.  
Right-wing Terrorists 
 Right-wing domestic terrorists are among the least organized terrorists; these 
groups, often dominated by skinheads, seek to do away with liberal democratic 
governments and create fascist states in their place.99 The Ku Klux Klan, for example, is 
a widely-known white supremacist group whose activities demonstrate right-wing 
domestic terrorism. The 1996 bombing at the Centennial Park in Atlanta, Georgia, is 
another example of a right-wing terrorist act. 
The following is a list of the motivations and tactics of right-wing terrorist groups: 
 MOTIVATIONS 
¾ New World Order 
¾ Gun control 
¾ Apocalyptic views 
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TACTICS  
¾ Bombings  
 The FBI says that America’s most serious domestic threat comes from right-wing 
militant groups including skinheads, Neo-Nazis, militia members, and the “Christian 
Patriot” movement. 
Special Interest Terrorists 
 Lastly, special interest or “single-issue” terrorist groups pose a critical threat to 
the homeland.  Some references use the term special-interest terrorism, which is 
described as resolutions sought to bring about widespread political change such as animal 
rights, environmental issues and the abortion movement.100  Special-interest terrorism 
was first noticed in the early 1990s, and over the past five years has accounted for the 
majority of domestic terrorism incidents. 
The following is a list of the motivations and tactics of special-interest terrorist groups: 
 MOTIVATIONS 
¾ Animal rights 
¾ Environmental issues 





¾ Arson  
¾ Sabotage 
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 One notable incident of special-interest terrorism is the 1998 fire at the Vail, 
Colorado ski resort that caused $12 million in damage.   
International (or Transnational) Terrorists 
 These groups can be defined as those whose leadership and personnel are 
primarily foreign and whose motives are primarily nationalist, ideological, or religious.  
Moreover, the United States’ legal definition of transnational or international terrorism 
suggests that the acts occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or 
transcend national boundaries by their means, the people they intend to terrorize, or the 
location in which the terrorists operate or seek asylum.101 
 International terrorism has also been described as the unlawful use of force or 
violence committed by a group or individual who has some connections to a foreign 
power or whose activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of a political or social objective.  Recent examples include the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing.102  
MOTIVATIONS 
¾ Support for state sponsors 
¾ Hatred of western institutions 
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 Terrorism experts agree that one of the greatest threats facing national security is 
the threat waged by international, and specifically Islamist terrorist groups.  The 
Congressional Research Services stated in its January 2005 report that “radical Islamist 
fundamentalist groups, or groups using religion as a pretext, pose terrorist threats of 
varying kinds to U.S. interests and to friendly regimes.”104  The opposition of many 
Muslims toward America is said to be rooted in our way of life – including our modern, 
secular, and pluralistic values.105  According to Christopher Hewitt, “Islamic extremists 
hate the United States for what they see as its occupation of Saudi Arabia and its holy 
places, its blockade of Iraq, and its support for Israel.”106 
 Their motivations are many, but Islamic extremists have found a common cause 
in their extreme dislike of the U.S.  Al Qaeda has been successful in exploiting this hatred 
by rallying the various groups in a new terrorist alliance called the International Islamic 
Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.  In February 1998 Osama bin Laden 
issued a fatwa, or Islamic religious ruling which stated: 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military –  
is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in  
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which it is possible to do it… We—with Allah’s help – call on every  
Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with  
Allah’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and  
whenever they find it.  We also call on Muslim ulema [religious figures],  
leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and 
 the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are  




¾ Hatred for Western values 






State Sponsors of Terrorism 
 An ongoing threat against the United States’ security continues to be from the 
activities of state sponsors of international terrorism.  Traditionally, those groups include 
Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea.  Vice President Cheney has cited 
Iran as being on top of his list of “World trouble spots,” and as being a threat to world 
peace and Middle East stability.  Cheney also accuses Iran of being responsible for 
sponsoring terrorism against Americans as noted in a January 2005 Congressional 
Research Service Issue Brief.108 
Table 1 depicts the current condition of state-sponsored terrorism. 
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Table 1:  Spectrum of State Supported Terrorism109 
Active Supporter of ------------------------------- Passive or Less Active  
Terrorism      Supporter of Terrorism 
  
 Iran    Syria   Cuba 
        North Korea 
        Libya 
        Sudan 
 
 
 State sponsors of terrorism continue to view violence as a means to manipulate 
foreign policy.  Recently, North Korea, Cuba, and Syria have declined in this arena as the 
deteriorating economic conditions in the countries have so dictated.  However, these 
countries continue to support Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups in their anti-
American insurgent campaign in Iraq.   
 A horrific example of state-sponsored terrorism occurred on December 21, 1988, 
when two Libyan operatives shot down Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, 
killing 270 people.110 
 MOTIVATIONS 
¾ Foreign policy 
¾ Hate for western institutions 
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 An awareness of these organizations by fire, EMS providers, and police officers is 
important because the various groups’ ability to recruit, multiply, and splinter – thus 
spreading their hate massages within our country – is real.  The concern is that the 
continuous media attention on international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda may cause 
local groups to become more violent in order to redirect attention back to their own 
objectives.  Additionally, complacency among civilians and first responders is an issue 
because we have not been attacked from outside in over four years.   
C. TERRORIST STRATEGIES 
  
 Acts of terrorism, whether domestic or international, are not random.  Terrorists, 
like any other successful organization, use effective strategy to strike in a seemingly 
random manner, but these acts are traditionally well-planned and -implemented events.  
This misconception that terrorists’ attacks are spontaneous, compounded by the fact that 
first responders’ best-developed strategies enable them to respond to emergencies rather 
than prevent them, is a critical obstacle in the prevention of these tragedies.  If the 
emergency service community is to be proactive in its efforts to combat terrorism, it will 
be required to prepare strategies to deal with terrorists. Responders will benefit from 
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studying and learning terrorists’ strategies so as to predict, identify, and interrupt them in 
their planning stages.  
 In his early writings on terrorist bombing, Johannes Most argued that the strategy 
of terrorism rests on a number of connected propositions: “1. Outrageous violence will 
seize the public imagination; 2. Its audience can thus be awakened to political issues; 3. 
Violence is inherently empowering, and ‘a cleansing force’; 4. Systematic violence can 
threaten the state and impel it into de-legitimizing reactions; 5. Violence can destabilize 
the social order and threaten social breakdown (the ‘spiral of terror’ and counter-terror); 
and 6. Ultimately the people will reject the government and turn to the terrorists.” 111 
 More recently, terrorist specialists have identified nine strategic goals of 
terrorism: 
1. Intimidation:  Attacks are designed to transmit fear to the victims so they will 
bend to the will of the terrorist group in the future. 
2. Destruction:  Attacks are intended to destroy the social or political order and 
enemies through the actual destruction of commerce, property, or infrastructure. 
3. Acquisition:  Attacks designed to gain new recruits, money, or weapons could be 
accomplished through robbery, raids on armories, or impressing a sponsor with 
the boldness of the attack. 
4. Extortion or demand:  Attacks require the victim to make some concessions, 
such as parting with money, or force another choice the victim does not wish to 
make. 
5. Influence:  Attacks are designed to gain power or set in motion acts that might 
change or influence policies and/or political decisions. 
6. Overreaction:  Attacks are designed to ensure that a government overreacts and 
oppresses its own people.  Such overreaction may be projected through 
curtailment of certain basic freedoms of individuals, through the limiting of basic 
human rights, or through actions that may be seen as more horrific than those of 
the terrorist.  The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq is considered by many experts an 
overreaction to the 9/11 attacks. 
7. Revenge and reciprocity:  Attacks carried out to exact revenge upon an enemy 
for the death of a group member or damage to the group’s integrity. 
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8. Satisfaction:  The book Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why asserts that some 
terrorist leaders attack just for the satisfaction of harming their “enemy,” and this 
is borne out by the fact that such groups (including al-Qaeda) never claim 
responsibility. 
9. Survival:  Attacks demonstrate that the terrorist group is still active.  This 
strategy is often used in conjunction with acquisition, when sponsors need to be 
assured that the group is viable.112 
  
 There are two other common strategies in the world of terrorist plotting – they are 
misdirection and deception.  Misdirection, according to Nance, is the feint strategy of 
leading authorities to believe that the terrorist attack will occur in one spot, and then 
striking in another. Deception is the strategy of masking the true intent of the approach or 
execution of an attack.113  An example of misdirection is when a terrorist group explodes 
a small bomb in one place while the actual attack will occur elsewhere after law 
enforcement or fire services have responded to the first explosion.  Acts of deception 
have been used in the past when terrorists have disguised themselves in courier or 
firefighter uniforms to gain entry into a target and then initiate an attack. 
D. TERRORIST TACTICS 
 
 Although the ideologies of terrorists vary, they often utilize many of the same 
tactics.  This section will first discuss tactical objectives of the terrorist operatives, and 
then categorize the most common tactics themselves.  
 It is critical for homeland security professionals, including firefighters, EMS 
providers, police officers, and security personnel to learn their enemies’ capabilities.  
Tactical specialists like SWAT officers and Navy SEALs have been studying the tactics 
                                                 
112 Malcolm W. Nance, The Terrorist Recognition Handbook, (Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003), 
86. 
113 Ibid., 87. 
82 
and strategies of their opponents for years so that they can employ effective counter 
measures against them.  This lesson is equally important for firefighters in their pursuit of 
twenty-first century terrorism operations. 
 First, it is prudent to teach emergency responders the tactical objectives of 
terrorist organizations.  Tactical objectives are basically “street-level goals” of the actors 
conducting the attack; these fall into four general categories: action, demonstration, 
demands, and escape. 
1)  Action:  Attacks show that terrorists are capable of carrying out the operation as 
planned.  Terrorists on the street level want to successfully execute a violent operation, 
propagate the news of the operation, and make demands for concessions or influence.  
Successful or unsuccessful, any attack that gets out the door of the safe house meets this 
goal. 
2)  Demonstration: The objective is to attract the attention of the victim and society 
through the news media or word of mouth, and to demonstrate the power of the terrorists.  
The group must publicize the event in such a way that the strategic goals are eventually 
met.  Unfortunately, this goal is often met through the execution of hostages, 
indiscriminate bombings in crowded areas, or dramatic acts such as skyjackings.  News 
media coverage is critical to this goal. 
3)  Demands: Often the terrorist group will make demands whether a terrorist act is 
successful or not. 
4)  Escape: Survival is becoming less of an option for many terrorists as we witness the 
increased usage of suicide/martyrdom attacks.  This is a tactical objective (the terrorists 
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themselves may want to escape), not a strategic one, because the leadership may be 
concerned only with the terrorist act and not the life of the terrorist.114     
 Again, ideologies may vary significantly, but tactics used by terrorists have been 
the same for years.  Table 1 is a breakdown of terrorist tactics used worldwide, as noted 
in the U.S. Department of State’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism.”115 
Table 1:  TERRORIST TACTICS WORLWIDE ATTACKS 
ASSASSINATIONS 6 % 
OTHER 10 % 
HIJACKINGS 12 % 
ARMED ATTACKS 22 % 
BOMBINGS 50 % 
 
BOMBING 
Bombing is the most widely-used terrorist tactic.  According to the FBI, the greatest 
percentage of terrorist attacks in the United States involves bombings.  There are several 
reasons why terrorists use explosives in their attacks: 
 Dramatic, low-risk,  and they draw attention 
 Few skills are needed 
 Can execute attack remotely 
 Large groups are not required 
 Components are readily available 
 Government sponsors are difficult to identify 
 Forensic evidence is difficult to identify, collect and assemble116 
                                                 
114 Malcolm W. Nance, Terrorist Recognition Handbook, (Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003), 87. 
115 New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings 
Performance Level Direct/Indirect Course Participant Guide, (New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology, New Mexico, 2004), 2-17. 
84 
 This reasoning has been confirmed by Al Qaeda in its training manual, which 
recommends the use of explosives because “they are believed to be the safest 
weapon…Using explosives allows them to get away from enemy personnel and to avoid 
being arrested…Explosives strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.”117 Moreover, 
explosives have continued to be a highly desirable tactic because they are universally 
available, cheap, feature multiple and easy delivery methods, are highly concealable, and 
offer an outstanding destruction-to-weight ratio.118 
 Modern technology and ingenuity has encouraged terrorists to create new ways of 
delivering their bombs.  Some of the more popular mechanisms have been manual 
bombings, standoff bombings, vehicle and car bombings, letter bombings, aircraft 
bombings, and suicide/martyrdom bombings. 
 
KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING 
 Kidnapping and hostage-taking are unique in that they both require extensive 
planning and logistical support.  Both tactics have been proven to be an effective means 
of raising money and spreading propaganda.  A widely-publicized kidnapping occurred in 
2002 when terrorists abducted Wall Street Journal Reporter Daniel Pearl in Pakistan and 
then beheaded him.  A video camera was used to film the tragedy and then broadcast on 
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television for the entire world to see.  This horrific tactic continues to be favored in Italy, 
Ireland, Central and South America, and is being used more often in the Middle East.119 
 Although hostage-taking is often confused with kidnapping, it is a distinct tactic 
in its own right.  Hostage-taking refers to the seizure of a group of victims in order to 
gain publicity or concessions.120 Actors who engage in this tactic are employing the 
method primarily as a propaganda tool to maximize the effect of violence for political or 
economic gains.121 A prime example of this tactic occurred during the Munich Olympics 
in 1972, when Palestinian terrorists captured and later killed Israeli athletes in order to 
draw attention to their cause. 
HIJACKINGS 
 Hijacking occurs when a vehicle (land or air) is stolen in order to be converted 
into a bomb or other destructive device.122 Perhaps the most remarkable skyjacking in 
recent history occurred on September 11, 2001 when a group of nineteen Al Qaeda 
operatives seized four American airliners and used them as human-guided weapons of 
mass destruction. 
ASSASSINATIONS 
 A specialized form of violence that has proven to be a very effective terrorist tool 
is assassination.  Known as the ultimate weapon of intimidation against a target group, 
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the attacks are designed to gain maximum media attention as well as to have a major 
psychological impact on the victims’ constituents.123 Assassination has accomplished by 
many different means, including blade, poison, blunt force, hanging, firearm, sniper, 
explosives/ambush, drive-by vehicle, and light infantry weapons.124 
AMBUSHES 
 A surprise attack, or ambush, occurs from a concealed position on a moving or 
temporarily non-moving target.  This tactic is commonly used by the military and has 
more recently been plagiarized and used abroad by anti-American insurgents.  The Al 
Qaeda Training Manual includes instructions on ambushes and recommends blocking the 
victim’s car in traffic, then opening fire.125 
SABOTAGE 
 Sabotage is an act carried out for the intentional destruction of property or for the 
purpose of disrupting industrial or other governmental operations.126 Acts of sabotage 
have included blockading military installations, looting during street demonstrations, 
civil disobedience incidents, the disruption of transportation systems, damage to public or 
private property, etc.  Such activities are inflicted to cause financial loss and to instill 
fear.127 
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 The newest form of sabotage exists in the threats of cyber and ecological 
terrorism.  Cyber, or communications attacks can be delivered via the Internet, or more 
specifically by e-mail.  Public and governmental information, command and control 
systems, computers, and intelligence collection mechanisms are all susceptible to attack.  
An example of this recently occurred when the City of Long Beach Fire Department lost 
its 911 communications capabilities.   Losing this function is a very effective tactic in 
preventing first responders from assisting the public in time of need. 
 Ecological attack is a tactic that is often used in conjunction with other tactics in 
an effort to create large-scale ecological disasters.  This form of attack is initiated more to 
damage the natural environment over the long-term.  Such attacks could include a 
hazardous materials release, or by spilling large quantities of toxic materials into the 
environment. These types of attacks are often used by terrorists as a diversion to 
emergency personnel from other illegal activities.128 
 ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILES 
 Antiaircraft missiles are also known as MANPADS (Man portable).  They weigh 
only 40 pounds and have been used effectively by terrorists to bring down jet liners.  A 
2004 account of this tactic identified at least five large jet liners that had been attacked, 
and in two cases all people on board were killed.129 These are devices that can be 
recognized by LAFD members as they conduct daily operations in and around Los 
Angeles International Airport.  The MANPAD is a long tube that is fired off the shoulder 
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of the operative.  It resembles a green pipe that is more than five feet long and is usually 
stored in a case that is seven feet long. 
ARSON 
 Arson is the simplest terrorist tactic and can be effectively initiated by the group’s 
most junior members.  Arson used as a terrorist tactic includes setting fire to a building, 
gas station, ammunition facility, oil, fertilizer, or grain storage facility, or petroleum 
refinery. Ships or trucks transporting flammable liquids can also be targeted as weapons 
of mass destruction.130  Firefighters should have a heightened awareness of incidents of 
arson, as they are typically the first to arrive on the scene of a fire-related emergency. 
MARITIME ATTACKS 
 The sea has become a common battleground for terrorist attack.  There are many 
ways for terrorists to instigate attacks on the sea including mar-jacking (the seizure of a 
vessel), oil platforms, combat swimmer or diver, light infantry weapons assault from land 
or sea, or by using a vessel as a weapon, as in the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 
Yemen.  As the Port of Los Angeles is within the jurisdiction of the LAFD, maritime 
attacks should be considered as a likely avenue of assault.  
INDUSTRIAL / INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK 
 Domestic and international terrorists have employed attacks upon critical 
infrastructure as a means to instill fear and uncertainty in the government’s ability to 
safely protect its citizens.  Tactics have ranged from disturbances to the public 
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transportation systems, electrical grids, petroleum refineries, chemical plants, agriculture 
industries, and communications systems.131 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
 Enemies are seeking new and more creative means of attacking the United States.  
A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) allows them to achieve such an attack by the 
selection of multiple locations, which in turn results in greater levels of damage and 
disruption.  Terrorists can maximize their effects by conducting multiple well- 
orchestrated attacks.  A WMD incident may involve several attacks with the same kind of 
weapon striking at several geographically dispersed areas such as seen on 9/11.  WMD 
attacks are further designed to achieve maximum strain on resources and to create a 
heightened sense of vulnerability.132 
 Terrorists have expanded their operations to target critical infrastructure as means 
of magnifying a strike’s disruptive effects.  Such raids have been projected to damage our 
national security and economic stability by attacking the following sectors:   
 Agriculture 
 Food  
 Water  
 Public health  
 Emergency services  
 Government  
 Defense industry  
 Information and telecommunications  
 Energy 
 Transportation  
 Banking and finance  
 Chemical industry  
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 Postal and shipping industries133 
The tactics used in WMD attacks are vast and include chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive incidents.  These attacks can be carried out individually or in 
combination to reap dramatic results for the operatives. 
SUICIDE TERRORISM  
 Suicide bombings are “the most feared and rapidly expanding form of terrorism 
worldwide.”134 The recent terrorist attacks in London have magnified the fact that suicide 
terrorism is moving west and may soon be a problem in the United States.  In May 2002, 
FBI Director Robert Mueller III said that future suicide attacks on American soil are 
“inevitable.”135 Thus, many local law enforcement agencies are taking action by training 
line officers to recognize the indicators of suicide terrorism.   
 The fact is that police officers will not be responding to these incidents alone; 
they may not even be the first responders on scene.  Firefighters, Paramedics, and 
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) will be responding to incidents involving 
suicide bombers and may presently be ill-prepared to perform their duties and 
responsibilities.   
 Operational advantages of suicide bombings over normal terrorist bombings 
include: 
• Superior dedication to the mission 
• Precise delivery of the device to the target 
• Harder targets can be attacked 
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• The device has no window of vulnerability 
• No planned egress is required 
• No one is left alive to interrogate 
• No burden of wounded comrades exists 
• Psychological factors 
• Blood borne pathogens can be delivered  
Two basic types of suicide bombers exist — individual and vehicular. Each has its 
advantages and limitations in the eyes of the perpetrators. 
• Individual: These bombers carry the explosive device either on their body or 
within an object. Bombers can carry explosives in vests or aprons, belts, satchels, 
backpacks, the sole of a shoe, and even bras and boxer shorts. Among the objects 
bombers have used to carry an explosive device are boxes, gym bags, briefcases, 
guitar cases, computers, TV cameras, birdcages, and even a watermelon. Because 
explosive devices may be so well disguised, innocent individuals can be tricked 
into carrying them. Underwater divers can attack ships with suicide satchels or 
limpet mine charges.  
 
  The major limitations of individual suicide bombers are: (1) they can carry only a 
limited amount of explosives and (2) they have a limited range on foot. Advantages of 
these bombers are: (1) the logistical requirements to field them are much less demanding 
than those required to field a vehicular bomb and (2) they can reach targets that vehicular 
bombs may not be able to threaten, such as very important persons (VIPs), commercial 
aircraft, and the inside of venues such as shopping malls. 
 
• Vehicular: All motorized and non-motorized vehicles on land, air, and sea have 
the potential to be turned into a suicide bomb delivery platform. Car and truck 
bombs are most common, but commercial airliners, motorcycles and bicycles, 
donkey carts, small sailing craft, speedboats, and even submarines have all been 
utilized or attempted. Concerns have also been expressed over the potential use of 
light planes, micro lights, gliders, and small helicopters.  
 
 The major advantages of vehicular suicide bombing are: (1) the ability to carry a 
large explosive payload and (2) high levels of mobility. In addition, donkey carts and 
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bicycles are valued for their innocent appearance (who would expect explosives inside a 
bicycle frame?), while a microlight might be useful for its ability to access a hard-to-
reach target. Limitations of vehicular bombing are the increased logistical needs and the 
necessity of hiding the vehicles before its use in the suicide mission. 
E. TARGETS OF TERRORISM 
 
 For many years the LAFD has been completing “pre-fire” inspections of 
potentially high hazard (or high probability) occupancies within the fire station districts 
on the city of Los Angeles.  The purpose of these inspections is to learn about the 
business or occupancy and its potential hazards before fire companies have to respond 
under emergency conditions.  The Building Inventory Program is a program that takes the 
information gathered at the “pre-fire” inspections and inserts it into a standardized format 
which is then bound and placed on every fire apparatus in the city.  Topics such as 
hazardous chemical storage, ingress, egress, fire protection systems, occupancy loads, 
and emergency contact information are several of the topics that are included in these 
plans, which are maintained in the Building Inventory Books. This information has been 
invaluable in assisting fire fighters when responding to a situation in a previously 
assessed property. 
 Given the challenges fire service personnel now face in response to terrorism, a 
more thorough awareness regarding “target hazards” must be visited.  In the past, the 
focus of the pre-fire inspections was occupancies with high life loss potential, hazardous 
processing facilities, and buildings under construction.  These types of occupancies 
continue to be significant, but more appreciation needs to be given to learning about 
terrorist targets that have been commonly used in recent attacks.  According to the 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Terrorism in the United States,” the most terrorist 
attacks occur at commercial establishments and over 39% are waged upon government 
buildings, military personnel, and military facilities.  See Table 1 for a detailed analysis.  
 
Table 1:  Patterns of United States Terrorist Targets136 
PATTERNS OF U. S. TERRORIST TARGETS 
EDUCATIONAL BUILDINGS 4 % 
DIPLOMATIC BUILDINGS 10 % 
PRIVATE RESIDENCES 11 % 
GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS 19 % 
MILITARY PERSONNEL / FACILITIES 20 % 
COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS 36 % 
 
 This section will discuss how terrorists select their targets, identify the various 
target categories used in the past, and recommend those indicators and reportable items 
that first responders should know as they carry out their missions in today’s environment. 
TARGET SELECTION  
 Terrorist target selection is a process that is observable and predictable; therefore 
LAFD personnel can and should achieve an understanding of it.  Target selection depends 
on a number of factors, including the desires of the senior leadership of the terrorist 
organization, the feasibility of the operational plan as evaluated by the group’s senior 
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leadership, and the street level data-collection abilities and recommendations of the 
terrorist intelligence cell responsible for that function.  The following are factors that will 
be considered by operatives as they select a target for their master plan: 
 The selection of a target is based on the strategic importance and physical 
characteristics of the target; this is known in military parlance as targeteering.  
Generally, the people who evaluate and eventually choose the target are known as 
targeteers. 
 Terrorist field leadership and/or the intelligence cell will normally select the 
target, but anyone in the group can give input. 
 Once the strategic goals of the group are met the senior leader will issue an attack 
or “go” order.  However, sometimes targets are struck for symbolic or political 
reasons. 
 
 The targeteer uses three basic tactical actions in deciding on a specific target, all 
of which are designed to achieve maximum dramatic impact: 
1. Speed – the target must be struck quickly to enhance the effect of fear. 
2. Surprise – the victims must be taken completely unaware; nothing should 
transmit the impending operation except only the vaguest of threats. 
3. Violence of action – the incident should strike terror and fear into the 
hearts of its victims through its absolute, horrific violence.137 
 
 The M.O.M. Target Selection Principle is the criterion that operations expert 
Malcolm Nance suggests terrorist targeteers will use, much in the same way military 
strategists use it in target selection.   
 Motive – Does the group have a reason for selecting this target?   
 Opportunity – Does the group have the opportunity to affect a strike against its 
enemies that is both meaningful and effective?  The targeteer will make it a 
priority to create or wait for the appropriate time, circumstances, and environment 
to strike. 
 Means – Does the group have the materials, manpower, secrecy, and support to 
carry out the mission? 
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Once the answer to M.O.M. becomes “yes,” the operational plan moves forward and 
attack is imminent.  
 Target selection and human risks in the selection process are usually dependent 
upon two factors—symbolic and economic value.  The following are potential targets that 
constitute high-profile (symbolic) and high-value (economic) targets.138 
Table 2:  Potential Terrorist Targets139 
 FEDERAL, STATE, & LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS 
 MASS TRANSIT FACILITIES  
(SUBWAYS, AIRPORTS, TRAIN STATIONS) 
 PUBLIC BUILDING & ASSEMBLY AREAS  
(SHOPPING MALLS, SPORTS ARENAS, THEATERS) 
 CONTROVERSIAL BUSINESSES 
(ABORTION CLINICS, FUR STORES, ETC.) 
 COMMUNICATION & UTILITY FACILITIES 
 WATER SUPPLY FACILITIES 
 RESEARCH LABORATORIES 
(MILITARY & ANIMAL FACILITIES) 
 OTHER LOCATIONS WHERE LARGE GROUPS CONGREGATE 
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 Attacks on symbolic targets represent the majority of strikes on American 
citizens.  Some examples include embassies and national airliners, which house our 
nation’s diplomats and carry our nation’s citizenry, respectively. Both kinds of targets 
bear the American flag.  It is widely believed that the World Trade Center buildings were 
chosen by Al Qaeda, due to their economic value and symbolism: the perfect marriage of 
both types.140 
GENERAL TARGET CATEGORIES 
 Terrorist target selection is generally divided into two basic types: hard and soft 
targets.  Hard targets are people, structures, or locations that are secure and therefore are 
difficult to attack.  The challenges in attacking these targets may include, but are not 
limited to: heavy physical security, active counter-surveillance or security cameras, 
random routines and patterns of operations, and air cover.  Military bases and the White 
House are examples of hard targets. 
Soft targets also include people, structures, or locations, but they have far less, if 
any, security, and have open public access.  Soft targets generally have poor or no 
physical security; physical security that is made to look hard but is actually weak; little or 
no counter-surveillance or video cameras; set routines and patterns of operation; 
and no ability to respond to an attack.141 
SPECIFIC TARGET CATEGORIES 
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 According to The Terrorist Recognition Handbook, specific target selection 
categories have their origins in the defense intelligence community but have been 
modified to enhance terrorism intelligence needs.  Depending on the strategies that 
terrorist groups employ, the specific targets they select will fall into some of the 
following categories. 
Strategic-value targets – those that would have an impact on the long-term ability of a 
victim society to function in a crisis, or that represent mass infrastructure value: entire 
cities; national command centers and national security locations; strategic reserves such 
as fuel depots, fuel refineries, or nuclear storage facilities; or executive leadership, such 
as the president or cabinet members. 
High-payoff targets – if damaged or destroyed will immediately contribute to ongoing 
strategic plans of the terrorist group or its economic allies such as critical energy targets, 
the stock exchange or other economic trading hubs. 
High-value targets – if damaged or destroyed will contribute to the degradation of the 
victim society’s ability to respond militarily or sustain itself economically.  These targets 
include military and federal law enforcement headquarters or emergency command 
centers; federal government offices and judicial centers; or critical commerce 
personalities. 
Low-value targets – if damaged or destroyed will contribute to localized fear and 
temporary harassment of the victim society.  These targets include localized 
transportation systems and non-critical public or commercial infrastructure facilities. 
Tactical-value targets – if damaged or destroyed will degrade local law enforcement 
(and fire)’s ability to respond to threats in the immediate area of the attack.  These targets 
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include military bases or equipment; police or military dispatch centers; low-level law 
enforcement supervisors; low-level military or civilian leadership; or individual or small 
numbers of military, police, or fire services. 
Symbolic-value targets – if damaged or destroyed will heighten public fear of the 
terrorist group: civilians; national treasures and landmarks; prominent public structures; 
and national representatives or diplomats. 
Ecological-value targets – if damaged or destroyed will damage the natural resources of 
a victim society such as large bodies of water or wide areas of agricultural resources and 
industries. 
 As the LAFD moves forward in its counterintelligence planning, careful 
consideration should be given to these seven specific target categories. 
 
TARGETING INDICATORS AND REPORTABLE ITEMS 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security 
combined efforts to develop the Terrorist Threats to the U. S. Homeland Reporting Guide 
(TTRG):142 
The purpose of the TTRG is to leverage the vast information collection and 
reporting resources of our state, local and tribal law enforcement partners, as well 
as other first responder partners, in recognizing activities or conditions that may 
be indicative of terrorist activity.  State and local organizations are on the front 
line in the war against terror and therefore have a critical role as primary sources 
of information.  Timely and relevant information from the [front lines] is critical 
to the identifications of terrorists and their supporters, development of insights 
into their plans and intentions, subsequent disruption of their operations.143  
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 Indicators and reportable items that firefighters and paramedics should be keenly 
aware of include: 
 Presence in a residence or vehicle of hardcopy or electronic materials (e.g., 
photographs or text descriptions/biographies) of important U.S. officials, 
facilities, security points, etc.; 
 




 Tests of security at airports, railway terminals, or border crossings and other high 
priority targets; 
 
 Details on personal security forces and operating procedures; 
 
 Activities to collect information about important persons such as their residence, 
work schedule, travel routes, family, acquaintances, physicians, vehicles, free 
time pursuits and venues, etc.; 
 
 Succession of detailed reconnaissance activities; 
 
 Theft of official uniforms or vehicles that would allow access to restricted areas; 
 
 Use of Internet or other media or methodologies for surveillance, mapping and 
research of prospective infrastructure and physical targets; 
 
 Surveillance of targets such as dams, airfields, tunnels, bridges, nuclear facilities, 
government agency headquarters, or other symbolic sites; 
 
 Stated animosities towards specific individuals or groups; 
 
 Use of almanacs and other reference materials that may signal operational 
intentions; 
 
 Communications chatter using general terms or coded language which points to 
categories of targets and their location in the United States or abroad; 
 
 Operational testing or reconnaissance in venues associated with targets of interest 
(e.g., airlines, mass transit, transportation infrastructure, energy infrastructure, or 
tourist attractions); 
 




 Interest by known or suspected terrorists in strategic buildings, important 
establishments, military bases, airports, seaports, border crossing points, 
embassies, and radio and television stations;  
 
 Attempts to recruit informants or agents who are knowledgeable about persons or 
facilities, including employees at border crossings, airports, and seaports; 
 
 Theft of plans or blueprints associated with strategic sites; 
 
 Surveillance or testing of security at active oil pipelines;  
 
 Interest by known or suspected terrorists in medical research labs; 
 Interest by known or suspected terrorists in symbols of American power or pride: 
monuments, military bases, government buildings, famous tourist attractions and 
cities; 
 
 Interest by known or suspected terrorists in American symbols of religion: 
synagogues, Jewish cultural centers, etc.;  
 
 Attempts to compromise the integrity of a system—especially systems that 
control utilities, government sites, financial records, information, or 
communication; 
 
 Interest by known or suspected terrorists in commercial targets such as theme 
parks or sporting events; 
 
 Interest in ships/freighters carrying explosive cargo; and 
 
 Interest in cruise ship itineraries and port schedules. 
 
 At first glance these indicators and reportable items may seem far-fetched, but 
when one considers the demographics of Los Angeles and ponders the incalculable array 
of potential target opportunities, these considerations become much more significant.  
MANAGING THE RISKS 
 According to The Counterterrorism Handbook, “one of the more difficult 
challenges facing defense planners is accurately assessing the likelihood of any particular 
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person, piece of property, or service becoming the target of a terrorist attack.”144 The 
LAFD has been working toward accurately assessing targets and vulnerabilities for 
nearly two years.  This program is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security 
and is designed to facilitate the strategic and tactical application and management of 
information related to the prevention of terrorist activity in Los Angeles.  Operation 
Archangel is a pilot program that is being developed in an effort to address the critical 
infrastructure protection initiatives as outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  If the model is successful it will be implemented nationally as a recognized 
smart practice. 
 Furthermore, Archangel is intended to create an opportunity for multi-agency, 
multi-disciplinary cooperation toward prevention, deterrence, response, and consequence 
management.   At the time of this writing the partners contributing to the program are 
LAFD, LAPD, Los Angeles County Sheriff and Fire Departments, the California State 
Office of Homeland Security, and the Department of Homeland Security.  There are four 
distinct initiatives within Operation Archangel: 
1. Identification and Prioritization of Critical Assets:  For the identification of 
assets deemed critical infrastructure as outlined in the Archangel Critical Asset 
Definition. 
2. Critical Asset Assessments (CAAs):  A three-tiered template for Critical Asset 
Assessments from a multi-agency perspective includes conducting vulnerability 
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assessments, the creation of Risk Information Folders, and the development of 
site-specific pre-incident security enhancement plans. 
3. Archangel Critical Asset Management Systems (ACAMS):  An interoperable 
database designed to manage a wealth of information associated with critical 
assets. 
4. Archangel Security Augmentation Teams:  A plainclothes, low-profile team of 
personnel specifically trained and uniquely equipped to provide undercover 
security to a threatened asset. 
In Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving 
Terrorism, risk management techniques are recommended for the implementation of 
critical infrastructure protection measures.  Moreover, comprehensive risk management 
will incorporate vulnerability and threat assessments.  The assessments are analyzed to 
determine the potential for the exploitation of security weaknesses.  The priorities are 
then established for reducing risks by adopting measures to prevent, recover from, or 
mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack.145 
 Sauter and Carafano explain five additional critical steps in an effective risk 
management process.  First, asset assessment is the process that focuses on identifying 
the assets which are most valuable and those targets whose destruction would have the 
worst consequences.  Second, a threat assessment entails determining who would want to 
attack certain targets and how these attacks might be initiated.  Third, vulnerability 
assessments are completed to determine security vulnerabilities in targets, and efforts are 
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geared toward measuring openness for attack.  Fourth, a risk assessment is conducted to 
combine and weigh the asset, threat, and vulnerability of the target.  Finally, 
identification of countermeasures to reduce risks should be assigned to the key potential 
targets.146   
 The Counterterrorism Handbook goes on to recommend several potential 
occupancies of particular interest to terrorist operatives planning an attack.  Particular 
care should be directed to companies heavily involved in the military-industrial complex; 
financial institutions; businesses working with advanced technologies, particularly 
weapons or defense systems; companies involved with petrochemical processing or 
storage or other environmentally sensitive products; utility companies; companies with 
manufacturing operations in third-world or developing countries; companies with 
operations in politically sensitive countries such as Israel, Sri Lanka, and Spain; 
companies with emotional or political implications such as a lumber manufacturers or 
abortion clinics; and corporations recognized throughout the world for their size, 
marketplace dominance, history, status, or simply for being known as an American 
symbol.147 
F. FIREFIGHTERS AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
 
 Among the various natural disasters the city of Los Angeles has faced throughout 
its history, catastrophic wildland fires stand out as having claimed many lives and caused 
extensive property damage.  To that end, annual brush fire training is mandated for all 
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personnel of the LAFD.  In addition to this, every fire officer is required to take a course 
in wildland fire behavior and weather conditions.  Furthermore, all personnel are required 
to be familiar with Book 100 (LAFD Brush Fire Operations) and Training Bulletin, 
which details hazards associated with wildland firefighting operations. These training 
measures ensure that firefighters are adequately prepared and have situational awareness 
in the rapidly changing circumstances of a wildland fire. Even so, fatalities occur. 
 The 1996 Calabasas Fire in Malibu, California is a prime example of what can go 
wrong in this situation.  Ten firefighters were overrun by fire and seriously burned 
because they were not aware of their surroundings. The critical errors made in this 
particular fire were the firefighters’ failure to recognize the wind change, topography, and 
terrain, all of which aligned to create an unmanageable conflagration.  In the end, one 
LAFD firefighter was critically injured and had to be airlifted from the scene to a nearby 
burn center.148 Since the Calabasas Fire, the department has redoubled its efforts training 
in brush firefighting operations because of the inherent danger linked with this type of 
hazard.  
The twenty-first century threat of terrorism is another matter that will require a 
similar dedication to training.  Just as fire behavior is predictable, so too are terrorist 
planning operations.  Firefighter’s who are more aware of their surroundings, whether in 
emergency or non-emergency situations, will be more apt to recognize suspicious 
activities transpiring around them.  A recent terror plot in Australia was thwarted by an 
observant lawyer going about his daily routine: As he waited for a bus he noticed a man 
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filming the Australian Stock Exchange building with a small home video camera.  Not 
long after this incident another Melbournian spotted someone filming the city train 
station.  Both citizens took the time to report these suspicious activities.  Police were then 
able to trace the car used in both cases to a known terrorist and were able to prevent the 
attack.149   
 “Perhaps the most important aspect for any emergency responder is awareness of 
their surroundings,” otherwise known as situational awareness.150 No matter what the 
situation – fire, EMS, building inspections, or community relations events – firefighters 
are ideally situated to observe odd or suspicious activity in their jurisdictions. The 
Department of Defense defines situational awareness as “the knowledge of where you 
are, where other friendly elements are located, and the status, state, and location of the 
enemy.”151  Further information on situational awareness broadly describes a person’s 
state of knowledge or mental model of the situation around him or her.  The origins of 
this concept can be traced back to the aviation industry where the term was used to 
describe awareness of tactical situations during aerial warfare.  Today’s challenge of 
terrorist attacks will require that those in the front line of defense (including fire and 
EMS responders) be as knowledgeable as possible.  
 Malcolm Nance states that “the most difficult and critical component of terrorism 
education is learning how to recognize and predict an attack.  Those responsible for 
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homeland security need to be well versed in terrorist attack pre-incident indicators 
(TAPI’s).  TAPI’s are behaviors; they are actions terrorists must take before they can 
carry out an attack.” 152The LAFD has taken an active role in homeland security 
planning, but has fallen short in teaching line personnel the indicators of terrorist 
planning activities. Because Los Angeles is a known target of future terrorist attack, it is 
critical that local first responders have answers to the following questions: 
 Who is a threat? 
 What options do those people have for carrying out an attack? 
 How might an attack be carried out? 
 What behaviors can be observed when they are preparing or ready to attack?153 
 
 
 Training programs have been used to help people develop better situational 
awareness by building relevant skills.  Endsley, an expert in situational awareness, 
identifies those relevant skills as communication skills, scan patterns, and contingency 
planning.  Developing these skills can help an individual build a large repertoire of 
relevant memory stores.  Increasing responder awareness of terrorist operations, tactics, 
surveillance techniques, tools, activities, strategies, and target selection will improve the 




                                                 
152 Malcolm W. Nance, The Terrorist Recognition Handbook, (Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003, 
3. 
153Ibid., 3-5. 
154 Situational Awareness available from Wikipedia: accessed 21 November 2005, 1. 
107 
V. READING LIST AND EXISTING TRAINING PROGRAMS 
A wide array of literature contributed to this partial training curriculum; it is listed 
here in order to provide access for reference or further study.  
Suggested Readings: 
Boltz, Frank, Dudonis, Kenneth J., and David P. Schulz.  The Counterterrorism 
Handbook:  Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques.  Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
LLC.,  2004. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security. n.d. Terrorist 
Threats to the US Homeland: Reporting Guide. n.p.: Available from 
http://www.leo.gov.  
Hewitt, Christopher.  Understanding Terrorism in America:  From the Klan to Al Qaeda.  
New York, NY: Routledge, 2003. 
Hoffman, Bruce.  Inside Terrorism.  New York, NY:  Columbia University Press, 1998. 
Nance, Malcolm W.  The Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Manual for Predicting and 
Identifying Terrorist Activities. Guilford, Conn: Lyons Press, 2003. 
Sauter, Mark A., and James Jay Carafano.  Homeland Security:  A Complete Guide to 
Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism.  New York, NY: The 
McGraw-Hill Companies, 2005. 
Townshend, Charles.  Terrorism:  A Very Short Introduction.  Oxford, NY:  Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
United States, Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, and National Fire Academy. 1999. Emergency Response to 
Terrorism: Self-Study. Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office. 
Available from http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18918 . 
United States, Dept. of Homeland Security and Office for Domestic Preparedness. The 
Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security Prevention and 
Deterrence. In U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness 
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[database online]. Washington, DC, 2003 Available from 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42747. 
United States. Office of Homeland Security. 2002. National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security. Access: 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20641. 
 
Suggested Training Courses: 
 
Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents: Performance Level Course 
by New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology & DHS 
 
Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings: Performance Level Direct/Indirect 
Delivery Course by New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology & DHS 
 
Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study by DOJ, FEMA, USFA, & NFPA 
 
Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program: Resources for the Law 
Enforcement Officer by National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement 
Training & DHS 
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2002.  
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Boltz, Frank, Dudonis, Kenneth J., and David P. Schulz.  The Counterterrorism 
Handbook:  Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques.  Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
LLC.,  2004. 
Borden, Frank, and Robert G. Lee.  2005.  The Emergency Response Team Model: A 
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